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Abstract 
 
Many studies considering the effects CEOs‟ characteristics have on the companies 
they run have been carried out in America. This study considers if organisational 
outcomes and strategic choices are partially predicted by managerial background 
characteristics as put forward by Hambrick and Mason (1984). It attempts to 
determine if the personality traits of CEOs of JSE listed companies (which result in 
them being classified as a narcissist) have an impact on the financial performance on 
the company for which they work.  
 
As identified by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), prior research has explored how 
executive‟s characteristics are manifested in organisational outcomes, however very 
little research addresses the narcissistic aspect of CEOs personalities. 
 
This study explored whether a relationship exists between CEO narcissism and 
strategic dynamism in a nonprobability, convenience sample.. A 5-item narcissism 
index was used as a proxy for narcissism and financial leverage, overhead efficiency 
and plant and equipment newness, were used to measure strategic dynamism. Multiple 
regression was used to analyse the data by applying CEO narcissism as the 
independent variable, strategic dynamism as the dependents variable whilst including 
control variables, including the CEO tenure, the age of the CEO, the age of the 
company, and indicator variable for the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy 
during which the CEO served his tenure and an indicator variable for which industry 
the company is operating in. The results of this study revealed that there is a 
viii 
 
correlation between the level of narcissism, captured using unobtrusive measures, of a 
JSE listed company‟s CEO and the level of strategic dynamism of that company.  
 
The results of the regression models suggest that whilst there is no observable 
relationship between narcissism and strategic dynamism, there is a relationship 
between narcissism and two of the components of strategic dynamism, financial 
leverage and plant and equipment newness.  
 
This research contributes further to the study of the effect of narcissistic CEO‟s on the 
companies for which they work and suggests that the personality traits of CEOs 
should be considered by company boards and shareholders when deciding to elect a 
person as CEO as well as by investors when deciding which companies to invest in. 
Key Words 
CEO Personality; Narcissism; Strategic Dynamism; Unobtrusive Factors 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
An article published in The Huffington Post entitled “The Dark Side of Executive 
Narcissism: How CEOs Destroy Companies' Reputation and Employee Morale” 
discusses how people often think of CEOs as the new rock stars. The author, Tomas 
Chamorro-Premuzic (2014) is a Professor of business psychology at University 
College London and says this way of thinking is understandable. “There is no shortage 
of examples for the megalomaniac habits of corporate bosses. For instance, John 
Thain spent $1.2 million redesigning his Merrill Lynch office during the 2008 
financial meltdown. Richard Fuld was living in a 6,000-square-foot Park Avenue 
apartment while driving Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy. And Lloyd Blankfein is 
still the best-paid banker in the world despite Goldman's public admission of 
deliberately selling sub-standard bonds to its clients.” 
 
Chamorro-Premuzic (2014) went on to state that if we think that these “shameless 
extravaganzas” are exclusive to Wall Street, they should think again. “Silicon Valley 
and the technology industry, once famous for promoting frugality, altruism and 
modesty, are putting greedy bankers to shame. Google's Eric Schmidt splashed $72 
million on a 195-feet yacht. Amazon's Jeff Bezos "invested" $42 million in a perpetual 
clock. Oracle's Larry Ellison spent $200 million, twice his annual salary, on beach 
houses alone. Moreover, Apple, Facebook, and Google may be the dominant players 
of the digital revolution, but they are still under investigation for tax evasion. If 
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bankers are the new rocks stars, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs are the new gangster 
rappers.” (Chamorro-Premuzic, 2014) 
 
The article concludes with a quote from Peter Druker, an American 
management consultant, educator, and author, whose writings contributed to 
the philosophical and practical foundations of the modern business 
corporation.  “The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never 
say 'I'. And that's not because they have trained themselves not to say 'I'. They 
don't think 'I'. They think 'we'; they think 'team'. They understand their job to 
be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don't sidestep it, 
but 'we' gets the credit.” 
 
As CEOs personalities‟ appear to have significant effect on the performance of 
the companies they lead, this study was conducted to investigate and help 
quantify whether the existence of one aspect of personality, narcissism, affects 
company performance. 
 
This report will first discuss the significance of this study and place it in 
context by way of the introduction section. Following on from the introduction 
the literature review will discuss narcissism and how its appearance in CEOs 
ultimately has been found to affect the performance of companies and their 
strategic dynamism. The methodology section will then detail how this study 
was performed and the results are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides a 
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discussion of the results as well as the limitations of this study and 
recommendations for future research. Whilst literature related to the themes 
addressed in this report may appear to argue narcissism is “good” or “bad”, the 
aim of this report is not conclude on something as subjective as whether 
narcissism in CEOs is “good” or “bad”; it is merely to establish whether 
narcissism in CEOs can be seen to have a particular effect on the company 
they work for. Upon establishing such a relationship, discussion then takes 
place surrounding possible implications of the findings as well as areas for 
further research. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research report was to determine the effect narcissistic CEOs have 
on the strategic dynamism of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). The study seeks to add to the body of research in behavioural finance. Whilst 
the concept of narcissism is adopted from a psychological point and briefly discussed 
the aim is not to venture into psychology rather, the adoption is to make a link 
between behaviour and the world of finance and business strategy. 
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
Theorists in various fields have discussed characteristics of top managers and this 
paper attempts to determine if there is a relationship between CEO narcissism and  the 
strategic dynamism of the company for which they work.  
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This study considers if organisational outcomes and strategic choices are partially 
predicted by managerial behavioural traits as put forward by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984). It therefore attempts to determine if the personality traits of a CEO 
(specifically narcissism) have an impact on the strategic dynamism on the company 
for which they work. 
 
As identified by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), prior research has explored how 
executives‟ characteristics are manifested in organisational outcomes, however very 
little research addresses the narcissistic aspect of CEOs personalities. Three reasons 
were suggested by Chatterjee and Hambrick as to why researchers of top executives 
have not undertaken research on narcissism. 
 
Firstly it must be addressed that some researchers may not consider narcissism to be a 
scientifically documented concept. Whilst the concept originates from Greek 
mythology, an abundance of literature investigates both the concept and measurement 
of narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Sigmund Freud (1953) published a paper titled “On Narcissism: An Introduction”, 
where Freud suggested that narcissism is actually a normal part of the human psyche. 
During the 1960s psychoanalysts Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut furthered research 
on narcissism. Kernberg (1967) introduced the term "narcissistic personality structure" 
and developed a theory of narcissism that suggested three major types. Following this, 
Kohut (1968) introduced the term "narcissistic personality disorder" and went on to 
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take some of Freud's (1953) earlier ideas about narcissism and expand upon them. 
Kohut‟s (1968) theory of self-psychology suggests that narcissism allows people to 
suppress feelings of low self-esteem and develop a sense of self.  
 
Kernberg (1976, 1980) shows narcissism developing as a consequence of parental 
rejection or abandonment. This parental- devaluation hypothesis states that because of 
cold and rejecting parents, the child defensively withdraws and comes to believe that 
it is only himself or herself that can be trusted and relied on and therefore loved. 
Kohut's (1976) theory however is actually a developmental theory of the self, where 
pathological narcissism can result from failure to idealize the parents because of 
rejection or indifference. A third theory has been presented by Millon (1981) and is 
referred to as a social learning theory of narcissism. This view proposes that 
narcissism develops not as a response to parental devaluation but rather as a 
consequence of parental overvaluation. The child is treated as a special person, 
provided with a lot of attention, and led by parents to believe he or she is lovable and 
perfect. Whilst it is important to understand the grounding of narcissism, it has been 
shown throughout the paper that non-pathological narcissism was referred to in this 
research which is explained in Chapter 2 – Literature Review. 
 
More recently, Emmons (1987) published an article entitled “Narcissism: Theory and 
Management” in which the different characteristics associated with narcissism are 
discussed as well as the primary method of measurement. In the 25 years following 
this publication, numerous research papers have been published regarding different 
techniques for measuring narcissism in a person (Raskin & Shaw,1988; Raskin & 
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Terry, 1988; Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007).  
 
The aspect of measurement leads to the second reason postulated by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) as to why narcissism is not well researched in behavioural finance. 
Researchers may be discouraged from researching narcissism in CEOs due to the 
difficulties relating to data collection and/or measuring narcissism (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). Methods of measuring narcissism and personality traits include the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory 40 (NPI 40) (Raskin & Hall, 1979), the usage of 
words (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003), the study of offices and bedrooms 
(Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002), the examination of personal websites 
(Vazire & Gosling, 2004) and the study of consumption patterns (Aaker, Benet-
Martinez, & Garolera, 2001). Whilst a survey methodology is unlikely to succeed with 
a topic as sensitive as narcissism (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006), it has been shown by 
Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest (1966) and Webb and Weick (1983), that it 
is possible to obtain multiple indicators from archival sources that directly represent 
the elements of the narcissistic personality and collectively capture this robust 
characteristic of CEOs.  
 
The final reason for lack of research stems from the perception that executive 
narcissism is not of much theoretical or practical significance (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). However, it has been found that narcissism in CEOs can be 
expected to have effects on substantive organisational outcomes, potentially including 
strategic grandiosity and submissive top management teams (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
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2007). Narcissism can affect a CEO‟s choices in areas such as strategy, structure, 
staffing, restructuring and resource allocation Hambrick & Finkelstein (1987). It 
therefore follows that many studies have found that executive‟s characteristics help to 
explain organisational outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). 
 
There is no accessible literature pertaining to studies in this field that have been 
carried out in the South African context and thus this research paper makes reference 
to international studies. Prior studies, suggest that overconfident managers use low 
discount rates when valuing future cash flows and invest in projects with lower 
internal rates of return. It must be noted that overconfidence is measured as a subset of 
narcissism but as a standalone concept, does not amount to narcissism. The ultimate 
manifestation of such behaviours had resulted in the CEO being classified as a 
narcissist and thus the effect of narcissism on company performance is measured 
(Ben-David, Graham, & Harvey, 2007). It was also found that the level of CEO 
narcissism affected the strategic dynamism of companies, the number and size of 
acquisitions and is positively associated with extreme performance (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Research shows that the measurement of strategic dynamism includes the use of ratios 
such as advertising intensity (advertising expense/sales), plant and equipment newness 
(net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment), research and development 
intensity (R&D expense/sales), overhead efficiency (selling, general, and 
administrative expense/sales), and financial leverage (total debt/equity) (Westphal, 
Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). 
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This research report examined the effect of CEO narcissism on dynamism of the 
strategy of companies listed on the JSE by using a 5-item index, to measure 
narcissism, as used in a study by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). Ratios representing 
plant and equipment newness, financial leverage and overhead efficiencies were used 
to measure strategic dynamism, as used in a study by Westphal, Seidel and Stewart 
(2001). Control variables for the CEO age, firm age, CEO tenure, presence of a COO, 
phase of the economy, industry the company is operating in and resource availability 
also formed part of the models tested in line with research conducted by Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) and Ham, Seybert and Wang (2013).  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
This study investigated whether narcissism has a significant influence on a company‟s 
strategic dynamism. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The manner in which CEO personality traits affect company policies has recently 
emerged as a topic of interest in academic research (Ham, et al., 2013). This particular 
study is in the area of behavioural finance and is found to be significant for a number 
of reasons. 
None of the prior studies addressing this area of research have been performed in the 
South African context. By investigating the existence of a relationship between the 
level of narcissism of a JSE listed company‟s CEO and the strategic dynamism of that 
company it can be determined if the relationships found to exist in other countries 
hold in a South African context. 
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Further, should the results indicate these relationships exist, it could be considered if 
corporate governance structures applied in South Africa are effective in achieving a 
balance of power.  
 
The results of this study will also be important for investors. Should the personality 
traits of a company‟s CEO have an effect on the long term performance of that 
company, investors should also be performing an analysis of the CEOs character 
before deciding to invest in that company. 
 
Other studies have found that CEOs are known to have considerable influence in the 
setting of their own pay, and they have nearly total control over the pay of other 
executives (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). In South Africa, JSE listed companies have 
to adopt the King III Code (“The code”) (Institute of Directors, 2009) on an apply or 
explain basis. The code (Institute of Directors, 2009) states that companies should 
remunerate directors and executives fairly and responsibly and that a remuneration 
committee should be appointed to oversee the process.  Should a link be established 
between the level of narcissism of a JSE listed CEO and the strategic dynamism of 
that company that is less significant than that established by studies conducted in other 
countries, it would present an area for further research into the effectiveness of 
corporate governance structures in South Africa with specific reference to the effect it 
may have on diluting the influence CEO personality traits have on the company.  
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The results of this study should also be of interest to the general public, as well as 
researchers interested in executive personality traits as studies have found that a better 
understanding of narcissism could lead to better explanations of the involvement of 
CEOs in episodes of misleading and unethical financial reporting that have been 
implicated in corporate collapses (Amernic & Craig, 2010). 
 
1.5 Definition of Terms 
Endogeneity: The possibility that narcissistic CEOs are drawn to certain situations 
and/or that some conditions particularly allow demonstration of narcissistic 
tendencies. 
JSE: The JSE refers to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
Narcissism: is defined as an important complex of personality traits and processes that 
involve a grandiose yet fragile sense of self and entitlement as well as a preoccupation 
with success and demands for admiration (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006). 
Overconfidence: This is a subset of narcissism and is not used interchangeably with 
the term “narcissism”. 
Projective Instrument: A projective test is a type of personality test which attempts to 
bring aspects of relevant behaviour, associations, perceptions, organisations and 
effective and interpersonal components to a conscious level so they can be studied 
(Freedheim & Weiner, 2003).  
Strategic dynamism: The degree of change in an organisation‟s strategy (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). 
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1.6 Limitations of the Study 
Firstly, because of data and cost limitations, the population from which the sample is 
obtained is restricted to those firms listed on the JSE. While it is believed that 
companies listed on the JSE are significant in their own right, it is unclear whether 
narcissism would have the same effects on organisations that are structured 
differently, for example, partnerships or owner managed enterprises.  
 
Secondly, the 5-item narcissism index developed by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
relies on unobtrusive indicators that are only partial and indirect proxies for 
narcissistic tendencies. Even though the five indicators have face validity, statistically 
cohere, and yield an index that predicts logically expected outcomes, it is not as 
reliable as more intrusive methods of collecting the relevant data, for example having 
the relevant CEOs complete a NPI40 questionnaire. Given the difficulty of obtaining 
reliable data on executives‟ personalities it appears that unobtrusive methods, as 
applied in this study, and other studies conducted by Aaker, Benet-Martinez and 
Garolera (2001), Gosling, Jin Ko and Mannarelli (2002), Pennebaker, Mehl and 
Niederhoffer (2003), Vazire and Gosling (2004) and Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), 
are the most appropriate methods to be applied currently. 
 
1.7 Assumptions 
It is assumed that the BFA McGregor database is a reputable one and thus all data 
obtained from it is accurate and can be relied upon. 
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Following the premise that one‟s degree of narcissism is relatively enduring and stable 
established in psychological literature (Cramer, 1998; Campbell, Foster & Finkel, 
2002; Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2005; Engelen, Neumann, & Schmidt, 
2013 and O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, & Chatman, 2013), this study assumes the level 
of narcissism to be constant and is thus measured at one point in time. 
 
It was stated by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) that discussions with several 
corporate communications executives indicated that CEOs are very attentive to the 
content and design of annual reports, and they particularly have strong opinions and 
control over how they themselves are portrayed. To verify the level of CEO 
involvement regarding the layout of the financial statements and the content of the 
press releases the CEOs or the investor relations centres of companies whose CEO 
were included in the sample were contacted and asked to verify whether the CEO did 
have significant influence on the layout and design of the financial statements as well 
as the content of the press releases. Out of the 26 CEOs included in the sample, 7 
CEOs were confirmed to have significant influence regarding the layout and design of 
the financial statements as well as the content of the press releases whilst the 
remaining 19 did not respond. The professional opinion of a psychologist was also 
obtained and supported the use of the non-obtrusive measures of narcissism used in 
this study based on the argument that this was a well established practice in the field 
of behavioural finance.  
As a result of this evidence as well as prior research supporting the use of the non-
obtrusive narcissism measures used in this study, it was assumed that all the CEOs 
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included in the sample did have significant influence regarding the layout and design 
of the financial statements as well as the content of the press releases.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to determine the effect a narcissistic CEO has on strategic dynamism of a JSE 
listed company it is necessary to understand the necessary aspects of narcissism as 
well as strategic dynamism. In this section narcissism is defined and the methods of 
measurement are explored. Following this discussion the term strategic dynamism is 
defined and measurement methods are explored. The effects of narcissistic CEOs on 
companies are discussed and finally the findings from the literature review are then 
concluded upon. 
 
2.2 Narcissism 
2.2.1 Definition 
The term “narcissism” is defined as an important complex of personality traits and 
processes that involve a grandiose yet fragile sense of self and entitlement as well as a 
preoccupation with success and demands for admiration (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 
2006). It has been shown that narcissistic individuals must repeatedly undertake 
actions which reinforce their self-image and as a personality characteristic, narcissism 
has been found to contain both cognitive and motivational elements. On the cognitive 
side, narcissism encompasses a belief in one‟s superior qualities while on the 
motivational side, narcissism carries an intense need to have one‟s superiority 
reaffirmed (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
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According to Morf and Rhodewalt (2001), narcissism is a dynamic, socially defined 
construct with two key elements: a positive, inflated, and agentic view of the self; and 
a self-regulatory strategy to maintain and enhance this positive self-view. Narcissists‟ 
positive self-views have been demonstrated empirically in several ways. Narcissists 
differentially think that they are special and unique (Emmons R. A., 1984), that they 
are entitled to more positive outcomes in life than are others (Campbell, Bonacci, 
Selton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004), that they are more intelligent and physically 
attractive than they actually are (Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994), and that they are better 
than others on agentic traits such as dominance and power, but not on communal traits 
such as caring and expressiveness (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002).  
 
Research has shown that narcissism can be considered and measured as a personality 
dimension rather than a psychological disorder, and that individuals can be assigned 
scores along that dimension using tools such as the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
40 (Raskin and Terry, 1988). This research paper is focussed on the personality 
variable of narcissism (sometimes referred to as „„normal narcissism‟‟) rather than the 
far less common clinical disorder of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) 
(Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, Narcissism, Confidence, and Risk Attitude, 2004) and it 
must therefore be clarified that narcissism in the context of this study refers to a 
personality trait and not a psychological disorder. 
 
It is important to distinguish CEO narcissism from related constructs that also deal 
with positive self-regard, most notably self-esteem, overconfidence, core self-
evaluation and hubris.  
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Self-esteem is a hypothetical construct being the overall effective evaluation of one‟s 
own worth, value or importance (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). As such, self-esteem 
aligns with that aspect of narcissism dealing with self-admiration; accordingly, the 
two variables have been found to be significantly correlated, with a spearman‟s 
correlation (r) of 56% (Emmons R. A., 1984). Although narcissists have high self-
esteem, they dwell on protecting, managing, and enhancing their self-view (Raskin, 
Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). Narcissists are therefore highly sensitive to interpersonal 
feedback and require continuous reinforcement of their inflated self-portrayals (Kernis 
& Sun, 1994). Self-esteem thus differs from narcissism in its absence of certain 
features such as arrogance, sense of entitlement and the continuous need for 
affirmation (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).  
 
Core self-evaluation is a broad, latent trait indicated by self-esteem, generalised self-
efficacy being an evaluation of how well one can perform across a variety of 
situations, emotional stability measured by the degree to which an individual is free of 
anxiety and locus of control, or beliefs about the causes of events in one‟s life (Judge, 
Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2003). As such, core self-evaluation aligns with that aspect 
of narcissism that deals with positive self-regard and self-potency and like self-
esteem; core self-evaluation does not encompass the continuous need for applause and 
adulation that characterises narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Narcissism: Measurement 
As it has been established that narcissism is a complex personality trait, therefore it 
appears that the measurement of such would pose complications.  As a result, the lack 
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of a suitable measuring device hindered the empirical study of narcissism until Raskin 
and Hall (1979) developed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). 
 
Many attempts have been made to create a measure of narcissism, resulting in 
projective instruments (Freedheim & Weiner, 2003), such as the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT) (Harder, 1979) and the Rorschach (Exner, 1969; Harder, 
1979 & Urist, 1977). Ashby, Lee, and Duke (1979) reported the development of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic personality Inventory (MMPI) Narcissistic Personality 
Disorder (NPD) Scale, consisting of 19 items from the MMPI and Solomon (1982) 
found that the NPD distinguished between individuals with healthy and pathological 
self-esteem.  
 
The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) (Millon, 1982) contains a 
narcissistic personality subscale whilst Phares and Erskine (1984) have developed a 
28-item scale designed to measure the construct of selfism within a social- learning 
framework. Individuals differ in selfism in the extent to which they construe situations 
that present problems in need satisfaction in either egotistical or nonegotistical terms. 
Phares and Erskine (1984) prefer the term selfism over narcissism because they 
consider selfism to be an attitudinal rather than a motivational construct.  
 
Raskin and Hall (1979) constructed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). The 
construction of the inventory was based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM-III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) criteria for the narcissistic 
personality disorder. These criteria include a grandiose sense of self-importance and 
uniqueness, preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, beauty, or ideal 
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love, exhibitionistic tendencies for constant attention and admiration, a sense of 
entitlement and an expectation of special favours without reciprocation and 
interpersonal exploitiveness (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Although the 
inventory is based on the DSM-III criteria, it is has been found that only extreme 
manifestations of those behaviours constitute pathological narcissism, and the 
assumption is that when exhibited in less extreme forms these behaviours are 
reflective of narcissism as a personality trait. In support of this assumption social 
critics such as Lasch (1979) have argued that narcissistic personality characteristics 
are prevalent in the general population. Fischer (1984) refers to this form of 
narcissism as subclinical narcissism. The creation of the NPI has created the 
opportunity for the empirical investigation of narcissism. 
 
This narcissistic personality inventory (NPI)) consists of a 40-item, forced-choice 
questionnaire designed to measure individual differences in narcissism as a 
personality trait. Many studies have now been conducted with the NPI including 
studies conducted by Raskin and Hall (1979), Raskin and Hall (1981), Emmons 
(1984), Raskin and Terry (1988), Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), Campbell, Goodie, 
and Foster (2004), Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006), Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) and Engelen, Neumann, and Schmidt (2013), among others, which found the 
index to be valid and accurate. 
 
Emmons (1987) performed a factor analysis over the NPI and identified four factors, 
which he labelled (1) Exploitativeness/Entitlement (I insist upon getting the respect 
that is due to me); (2) Leadership/Authority (I like to be the centre of attention); (3) 
Superiority/Arrogance (I am better than others); and (4) Self-absorption/Self-
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admiration (I am preoccupied with how extraordinary and special I am). After 
completing the factor analysis Emmons (1987) reiterated that they cohere as a unitary 
personality construct and other studies (Raskin and Terry, 1988; Watson and 
Biderman, 1993) also indicate that narcissism is a coherent, but multi-faceted 
personality dimension, which can be defined as the degree to which an individual has 
an inflated sense of self that is reflected in feelings of superiority, entitlement, and a 
constant need for attention and admiration (Bogart, Benotsch& Pavlovic, 2004). 
 
In a study conducted by Raskin and Terry (1988), and more recently Ames, Rose and 
Anderson (2006), the internal and external validity of the NPI was verified the use of 
longer inventories. 
 
Whilst the NPI is currently the most prevalent method for measuring narcissism its 
feasibility must be questioned with regard to capturing the narcissism of a CEO. A 
paper published on organisational research methods revealed that CEOs are reluctant 
to participate in survey research, and that a survey regarding sensitive information 
about their personality traits such as the NPI 40 would most likely yield exceptionally 
low response rates (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006). 
 
In a study addressing narcissistic CEOs and their effects on company strategy and 
performance it was determined that unobtrusive indicators of narcissistic tendencies in 
CEOs would be more appropriate (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Unobtrusive methods considered were ones such as observation and the written and 
spoken words of subjects as ways to learn about their preferences, perceptions and 
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personalities. As noted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), such a method would 
eliminate problems of reactivity, demand characteristics and researchers‟ expectations. 
The use of such a method would however not appear feasible when attempting to 
study the characteristics of a CEO as it is unlikely they would be willing to participate 
in such research as with the completion of the NPI 40. 
 
Other unobtrusive measures of personality have recently been used by researchers. 
The usage of words has been used to detect individual differences by Pennebaker, 
Mehl and Niederhoffer (2003), offices and bedrooms have been studied as physical 
manifestations of personalities by Gosling, Jin Ko and Mannarelli (2002), personal 
websites have been examined as indicators of identity claims by Vazire and Gosling 
(2004) and consumption patterns have been used as carriers of personality constructs 
by Aaker, Benet-Martinez and Garolera (2001).  
 
In a study conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) a 5-item unobtrusive 
narcissism index was developed, validated and used. The selection for the indicators 
was based on two main criteria. Firstly, each indicator needed to qualify as a 
manifestation of the CEOs personality thus the indicator needed to be greatly under 
the control of the CEO and not driven primarily by institutional or other external 
forces (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Secondly, each indicator needed to reflect one 
or more aspects of the narcissistic personality.  
 
The development of the index was guided by the facets of narcissism, as discussed 
earlier, identified by Emmons (1987). By definition, narcissism is a superordinate 
construct that has multiple elements (Edwards, 2001) and as a result Chatterjee and 
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Hambrick (2007) did not attempt to identify indicators that would fit cleanly into the 
categories established by Emmons (1987), instead most of the indicators can 
reasonably be seen to align with more than one of Emmons‟s (1987) facets. 
 
The five indicators used by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) are as follows: the 
prominence of the CEO‟s photograph in the company‟s annual report, the CEO‟s 
prominence in the company‟s press releases, the CEO‟s use of first person singular 
pronouns in interviews, the CEO‟s cash compensation divided by that of the second-
highest paid executive in the firm, and the CEO‟s non-cash compensation divided by 
that of the second highest paid executive in the firm. These indicators co-varied 
greatly in the sample used to validate the index, allowing their combination into a 5-
item narcissism index. 
 
2.2.2.1 Prominence of the CEO’s photograph 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) argue that the company‟s annual report not only 
provides an opportunity for the CEO to report on the company‟s progress and 
prospects, but also to showcase them as the company‟s leader. It was acknowledged 
that whilst CEO photographs are standard features of annual reports they are however 
not universal or of uniform prominence. It was stated by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) that discussions with several corporate communications executives indicated 
that CEOs are very attentive to the content and design of annual reports, and they 
particularly have strong opinions and control over how they themselves are portrayed. 
They argue that it is therefore expected that the narcissistic CEO will seek a great deal 
of visibility in the annual report, both as an exercise of vanity and as a strong 
declaration that he/she is more important than all others in the firm; aligning with the 
22 
 
personality facets identified by Emmons (1987). The indicator was rated as follows in 
the study conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007): four points if the CEO‟s 
photo was of him/her alone and occupied more than half a page, three points if the 
photo was of the CEO alone and occupied less than half a page, two points if the CEO 
was photographed with one or more fellow executives and one point if there was no 
photograph of the CEO. This measure of narcissism was also used in a study 
conducted by Olsen (2011). 
 
2.2.2.2 CEO prominence in company press releases 
The content of these press releases issued by companies appears to be under the 
CEO‟s control completely as it was found that each CEO has very stringent guidelines 
for external announcements and personally reviews all but the most routine issuances 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Following the identification of narcissistic personality 
traits (Ames & Rose, 2006; Bogart, Benotsch & Pavlovic, 2004; Emmons, 1987 & 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) deduced that narcissistic CEO will insist on being 
mentioned in as many press releases as possible, both as an exercise of vanity, or the 
desire to be showcased, as well as an assertion of authority. To develop this measure, 
they calculated the number of times the CEO was mentioned by name in the 
company‟s press releases and divided it by the total number of press releases. 
 
2.2.2.3 CEO’s use of first person singular pronouns 
Speech has been identified as a form of expressive behaviour, reflecting the most 
dominant and consistent personality traits of an individual (Ramsay, 1968) while 
personal pronoun usage is an indicator of narcissism, indicating self-absorption in 
particular (Raskin & Shaw, 1988). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) used digital 
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transcripts of interviews of CEOs conducted by journalists or financial analysts, 
isolating only those portions that represented the CEO‟s words. They then counted the 
number of first person singular pronouns (I, me, mine, my, myself) used by the CEO, 
divided by the sum of those pronouns plus all first person plural pronouns (we, us, 
our, ours, ourselves) thus providing a percentage of all first person pronouns that were 
singular.  
 
2.2.2.4 Two measures of relative pay 
CEOs are known to have considerable influence in the setting of their own pay, and 
they have nearly total control over the pay of other executives (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 
1989). The narcissistic CEO believes that he/she is far more valuable than anyone else 
in the firm, and this then becomes reflected in the CEO‟s compensation relative to 
others. Following Hayward and Hambrick‟s (1997) measure of self-importance, 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) used two measures of the CEO‟s relative pay. 
Relative cash pay was the CEO‟s cash compensation (salary and bonus) divided by 
that of the second highest-paid executive in the company. Relative non-cash pay was 
the CEO‟s non-cash compensation (deferred income, stock grants, and stock options 
(using Black-Scholes valuation)) divided by that of the second highest paid executive. 
The results generated by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) did not change if they used 
the pay of the top four executives, excluding the CEO, in the denominators of their 
measures. 
 
[Insert Appendix B] Appendix B illustrates how Chatterjee and Hambrick‟s (2007) 
five indicators align with the facets of narcissism identified by Emmons (1987) as 
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well as providing illustrative items from the NPI that loaded onto Emmons‟ four 
facets of narcissism.  
 
2.3 Strategic Dynamism 
2.3.1 Definition 
Strategic dynamism refers to the degree of change in an organisation‟s strategy 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). As noted by Chaterjee and Hambrick (2007), this 
degree of change is a central construct in the study of strategic management.  
 
It has been found that industry conditions (Birkinshaw, Morrison & Hulland, 1995), 
organisational size (Chen and Hambrick, 1995), slack (Singh, 1986), and other 
contextual factors affect the degree of dynamism observed in companies‟ strategies. It 
has also been found that, after controlling for contextual conditions, executives‟ 
characteristics are associated with the amount of resulting change in the strategies of 
the companies. Miller (1991) found that CEO tenure and Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1990) found that top management team tenure is negatively related to strategic 
dynamism. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) determined that the average amount of 
formal education of top management team members, as well as the heterogeneity of 
their educational specialisations, is positively related to strategic change. Evidence 
therefore exists that some executives are more inclined to change their company 
strategies than are others. It appears that narcissistic CEOs can be expected to favour 
strategic dynamism as is through adopting new strategic initiatives that narcissistic 
CEOs can engage in the exhibitionism that will create a captive audience. Continuing 
with or refining and elaborating on an existing strategy, appears to be the preferred 
course of action for a CEO who is less narcissistic. Such an executive may be willing 
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to pursue what Miles and Snow (1978) called a defender strategy or what Levinthal 
and March (1993) called an exploitation strategy. It has been found that narcissists 
need an attentive audience, which in turn means they need drama and therefore 
narcissistic CEOs will favour strategic dynamism, to deliver a drama that will gain 
attention in a way that strategic stability cannot (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Strategic Dynamism: Measurement 
Prior studies by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), Thomas, Litschert and Ramaswamy 
(1991) and Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) measured business strategy according 
to key resource allocations across the primary functional areas of the firm. Examples 
of such strategic dimension included advertising intensity (advertising expense/sales), 
plant and equipment newness (net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment), 
research and development intensity (R&D expense/sales), overhead efficiency 
(selling, general, and administrative expense/sales), and financial leverage (total 
debt/equity). The first three dimensions capture marketing, technology, and capacity 
expansion activities, while overhead efficiency reflects the cost structure of the firm, 
and the firm's capital management is indicated by financial leverage (Westphal, 
Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). This set measurement approach based on Mintzberg's 
(1978) conception of strategy as a pattern of actions and was found to effectively 
capture the competitive profile of the firm (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). A viable 
alternative approach to measuring business strategy classifies firms into discrete 
configurations of resource deployments (Porter, 1998). Although this approach has 
found to have some face validity, the continuous measure captures gradations in 
strategic change that range along a continuum from relatively modest adjustments in 
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spending levels to relatively large changes in resource allocation (Westphal, Seidel, & 
Stewart, 2001). 
 
2.4 The Effect of Narcissistic CEOs on Companies 
Studies have shown that narcissists overestimate their abilities and when measured, do 
not outperform people not classified as narcissists. As a result narcissists have been 
found to make riskier decisions (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, Narcissism, 
Confidence, and Risk Attitude, 2004). 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) found that there is a strong positive relation between the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow and executive overconfidence and that 
overconfidence matters more in firms that are equity dependent, whilst Ben-David, 
Graham and Harvey (2007) found that companies with overconfident CFOs use lower 
discount rates to value cash flows, and that they invest more, use more debt, are less 
likely to pay dividends, are more likely to repurchase shares, and they use 
proportionally more long-term, as opposed to short-term, debt. Further research shows 
that overconfident CEOs undertake riskier projects, invest more heavily in innovation, 
achieve a greater total quantity of innovation as measured by patent applications and 
patent citations, and are more effective innovators (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2010). 
 
A study conducted by Hribar and Yang (2013) provided evidence that managerial 
overconfidence manifests itself as excessive optimism about future earnings thus 
leading to CEOs making exaggerated earnings forecasts. As a result, overconfident 
CEOs have found to be more likely to issue and subsequently fall short of their own 
forecasts. The same study also found that it was unclear as to whether overconfidence 
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increases performance. It was however found that there is no sign whatsoever that it 
reduces performance; consistent with the idea that there are advantages as well as 
disadvantages to CEO overconfidence. 
 
In a study conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), the effects of narcissistic 
CEOs on company strategy and performance were measured by formulating four 
hypotheses, the first of which bears the most relevance to this study. The hypothesis 
stated that “The greater the narcissistic tendencies of a CEO, the greater the dynamism 
of the company‟s strategy.” Narcissists have been shown to be exhibitionists (Raskin 
& Terry, 1988) and thus to gain the attention and admiration of others must execute 
bold moves. This hypothesis was therefore tested using indicators that are controllable 
by the CEO and are important strategic choices (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
Control variables and a correction for endogeneity were included in the model which 
yielded results supporting the hypothesis. For each dependent variable a model with 
control variables and then a model with the narcissism score were used, showing a 
positive and significant effect of narcissism on changes in resource deployment to 
represent strategic dynamism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
Consistent with Anderson and Tirrell (2004), it is suggested by Brown (1997) that 
many narcissistic CEOs make accounting policy choices and earnings management 
decisions to maintain a positive sense of self, defend their egos and preserve self-
esteem. The features of financial accounting that potentially enable such ego-
defending behaviour by certain narcissistic CEOs was explained by Schwartz (1991) 
whose investigation was prompted by arguments that the existence of extreme 
narcissism explain corporate decay. Further, because narcissism has been found to lie 
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at the heart of leadership by Kets de Vries (2004), it appears that a better 
understanding of narcissism, could lead to better explanations of the involvement of 
CEOs in episodes of misleading and unethical financial reporting that have been 
implicated in corporate collapses (Amernic & Craig, 2010).  
 
Mergers and acquisitions literature is another area in which the significance of the 
psychological characteristics of the CEO with respect to explaining acquisitiveness 
and value effects is considered (Malmerndier & Tate, 2008). The first suggestion that 
the psychological characteristics of the CEO bare significance in the M&A context 
was made by (Roll, 1986). It was found that losses to acquiring shareholder on the 
announcement of a deal may be caused by hubristic CEOs who overbid for a target as 
they overestimate both synergies and their ability to realise them. Further empirical 
research was performed in the fields of strategic management and finance regarding 
the implications of this hubris hypothesis. The findings of this further research reveal 
that more hubristic CEOs tend to offer higher bid premiums (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997), and that the markets react less favourably to acquisitions carried out by 
overconfident CEOs (Malmerndier & Tate, 2008). 
 
A detailed analysis was provided by a separate stream of research focussing on the 
private takeover process. These results revealed many new features of takeover 
transactions (Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Aktas, De Bodt, & Roll, 2010). Findings from 
a further study showed that higher levels of target CEO narcissism are associated with 
higher bid premiums and lower announcement returns to acquiring firm shareholders. 
Considered together, these results make a strong case for considering the effect of the 
29 
 
psychological characteristics of CEOs on all aspects of the takeover process (Aktas, 
De Bodt, Bollaert, & Roll, 2012).  
 
 
It has also been noted that narcissistic CEOs may be more prevalent in some industries 
than others. Such CEOs may be drawn to dynamic and high discretion industries such 
as information technology and fashion and may not be found in more low-key 
industries such as insurance or basic metals (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
 
As this research indicates that narcissistic CEOs make costly decisions as a result of 
this personality trait, it further develops agency theory. This theory refers to an agent 
(company management) acting on behalf of the principal (company shareholders) 
resulting in possible conflicts of interest as the agent may act in their best interest and 
not in the best interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). The research discussed 
above therefore indicates that; as it has been found that a narcissistic CEO can result 
in costly decisions being made, it should be considered if narcissism has an impact on 
transaction costs.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
It is therefore apparent from the literature that narcissism is a clearly defined 
personality construct (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Many methods of measuring 
narcissism, both direct (Raskin & Hall (1979); Emmons (1981); Raskin & Terry 
(1988); Ames, Rose & Anderson (2006)) and unobtrusive (Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007);Olsen (2011)), have been explored and the personality traits of CEOs have 
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been found to have an effect on the companied which they run (Campbell, Goodie & 
Foster (2004); Malmendier & Tate (2005); Ben-David, Graham & Harvey (2007); 
Hribar & Yang (2013)). Westphal, Seideland and Stewart (2001) found that strategic 
dynamism has been measured using advertising intensity (advertising expense/sales), 
plant and equipment newness (net plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment), 
research and development intensity (R&D expense/sales), overhead efficiency 
(selling, general, and administrative expense/sales), and financial leverage (total 
debt/equity),and it can be concluded that the overall finding of the literature indicates 
that unobtrusive measures are currently the optimal way in which to measure 
narcissism and that the level of narcissism has been found to have an effect on the 
companies for which the studied CEOs work (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
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Chapter 3 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis, CEO narcissism has a significant impact on the strategic dynamism of 
JSE listed companies, was tested using a CEOs scores on the 5-item narcissism index 
as developed and validated by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) and used in a study 
conducted by Olsen (2011). Firstly data was obtained in order to populate the 
narcissism index for each CEO in the sample and then the relationship between 
narcissism and strategic dynamism was explored controlling for various factors. 
 
This study made use of unobtrusive measures of narcissism in order to compile the 5-
item narcissism index. To verify the level of CEO involvement regarding the layout of 
the financial statements and the content of the press releases the CEOs/Investor 
Relations Centres were contacted and asked to verify whether the CEO had significant 
influence regarding the layout and design of the financial statements as well as the 
content of the press releases. Out of the 26 CEOs included in the sample, 7 confirmed 
that the CEO did have significant influence regarding the layout and design of the 
financial statements as well as the content of the press releases whilst the remaining 
19 did not respond, representing a 27% response rate. The professional opinion of a 
psychologist was also obtained and supported the use of the non-obtrusive measures 
of narcissism used in this study. These responses together with the use of non-
obtrusive measures in studies such as those conducted by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick(2007), Olsen (2011) and Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert and Roll (2012) reveal 
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that reliance can be placed upon the use of these non-obtrusive factors used to indicate 
the level of narcissism of a CEO. This is discussed in detail in sections 3.2.2 
Instrument and 3.3 Sampling and Data Collection. 
In order to address the hypothesis formulated in this study the appropriate statistical 
measure needed to be selected. Multiple regression was selected as the most 
appropriate statistic tool to test whether such a relationship exists, which is discussed 
further in section 3.4 Data Analysis. 
 
3.2 Study Design and Methodology 
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
H1: There is a significant relationship between CEO narcissism and the company‟s 
strategic dynamism, controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm age, resource 
availability, the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during which the CEO 
served his tenure and the industry in which the company operates. 
 
H2: There is a significant relationship between CEO narcissism and the company‟s 
financial leverage applied by the company, controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm 
age, resource availability, the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during 
which the CEO served his tenure and the industry in which the company operates. 
 
H3: There is a significant relationship between CEO narcissism and the company‟s 
overhead efficiency, controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm age, resource 
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availability, the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during which the CEO 
served his tenure and the industry in which the company operates. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between CEO narcissism and the company‟s 
plant and equipment newness, controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm age, 
resource availability, the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during which 
the CEO served his tenure and the industry in which the company operates. 
 
3.2.2 Instrument 
3.2.2.1 Narcissism Index 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) used descriptive statistics and correlations of the five 
indicators of CEO narcissistic tendencies over 111 CEOs. They found that the 
correlations among the indicators were all positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Further testing of the coherence among the indicators was conducted including a 
factor analysis, for which all indices were at or above the recommended standards, 
and calculation of the Cronbach alpha. To develop their narcissism index Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) calculated the simple mean of the five measures, after 
standardisation, for each CEO. The Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.75 above the 
level acceptable for forming a new index as stated by Nunnally and Bernstein (1994). 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that their results remained unchanged when 
they calculated the narcissism index using the factor scores of the individual items. 
 
To verify that the 5-item index reflects the characteristics of the individual and not the 
firm, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) conducted a two-step analysis. Firstly 
companies within their sample that had two CEOs over the period were identified, 
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resulting in six companies that could be used for this test. The narcissism scores per 
the 5-item index for the CEOs of these companies were examined and narcissism 
scores for the successive CEOs for that company exhibited considerable 
inconsistency, ultimately producing an average Spearman correlation of -.46 which 
indicates that the narcissism scores are not due to persistent company techniques. 
Secondly, CEOs included in the sample that served as CEOs of other public 
companies were identified. Their narcissism scores were measured in their post 
relative to the sample as well as in their two successive posts. A Spearman correlation 
of 0.9 suggests consistency in the level of narcissism exhibited by the individual as 
per the 5-item index across successive positions. The pattern of with-person 
consistency combined with the pattern of with-firm inconsistency suggests that the 
narcissism scores per the 5-item index reflect more about the CEOs as individuals 
than about their firms (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
 
A validation test was also conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) to further 
test the construct validity of their narcissism measure. Five security analysts 
specialising in the industry the sample of companies was selected from were asked to 
rate the degree of narcissism of the CEOs of the 40 largest CEOs in the company. As 
found by Fogarty and Rogers (2005), security analysts have many interactions with 
CEOs and pride themselves in asking them unscripted questions as to gather fresh 
insights regarding the companies on which they are reporting.  It therefore appears 
that analysts are in a position to observe CEO‟s personalities firsthand and tend to 
supplement their technical analyses of firms by focussing on the personal qualities of 
CEOs (Khurana, 2002). 35 of the CEOs has multiple ratings resulting in a single-item 
Intra Class Coefficient of 0.75 (p<.01) suggesting a high level of agreement between 
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analysts regarding their rating of the CEOs (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). The 
correlation between the average analyst‟s rating and Chatterjee and Hambrick‟s 
(2007) unobtrusive 5-item narcissism index was 0.82 (p<.01) indicating a substantial 
correlation between the analysts‟ perceptions and Chatterjee and Hambrick‟s (2007) 
5-item index. Corroborative evidence was thus found that the unobtrusive 5-item 
narcissism index measure taps the narcissistic tendencies of CEOs (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007).  
 
3.3 Sampling and Data Collection 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A sample of JSE listed companies‟ CEOs was selected for this study. Prior studies 
have examined the computer software and hardware industries (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 2007; Schrand and Zechman 2011) however this study was expanded to 
examination of CEO narcissism by considering all companies listed on the JSE. It was 
found reasonable by Olsen (2011) that the executive characteristics would vary across 
these firms drawn from numerous different industries and settings and thus the 
population is deemed appropriate for this study.  
 
After the identification of the initial set of companies several filters were applied to 
ensure the sample fit the overall design and methodology. Chatterjee and Hambrick‟s 
(2007) approach to studying the effects of narcissistic CEOs on the strategic 
dynamism of the company were adopted as discussed in section 2.3.2. 
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An initial sample of 60 companies was selected. These were weighted based on the 
percentage that industry represents on the JSE to represent the industry dispersion of 
all JSE listed companies. One of the companies is currently delisted; however it was 
listed for the duration of the CEO tenure relating to the CEO included in the sample. 
 
Selected CEOs were screened and only included if they had four or more years of 
tenure with the company included in the sample, along with the requirement that the 
CEO began his/her tenure after 2001. The tenure length requirement is a critical 
design choice because it allows the measurement of narcissistic tendencies in years 
two and three of the CEO‟s tenure, with the first year being omitted due to anomalies 
that arise with CEO turnover and succession. Tenure years four and beyond were then 
used to test the effects of narcissism. This lagged design reflects the view of 
narcissism as a stable personality disposition as adopted by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) which is a construct that is supported by Cramer (1998); Campbell, Foster & 
Finkel (2002); Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton (2005); Engelen, Neumann, & 
Schmidt (2013) and O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, & Chatman (2013).  This design 
removes any circular or recursive relationship between the narcissism measure and the 
dependent variables (Olsen, 2011). 
 
 The requirement that the CEO started his/her tenure after 2001 was applied as that 
was the earliest that some of the data included in this analysis was available in digital 
form. The 2012 financial year was applied as the cut-off date due to the availability of 
published audited financial statements. Each CEO to be included was then screened 
for available data as the measure of CEO narcissism requires that the company‟s 
annual report for years two and three of each CEO‟s tenure be available in digital 
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form and that press releases, interviews and detail regarding executive remuneration is 
also available for the second and third years of that CEO‟s tenure. 
 
The final sample after applying the relevant filters yielded a sample of 26 CEOs with 
a total number of 110 observations representing 136 firm years to be included in the 
study. The 110 observations represent 136 firm years as the results from year one 
were not included and the results from years two and three were averaged. The final 
number of observations included in the data analysis after performing the tests set out 
in section 3.3.4 amounted to 85. 
 
3.3.2 Delimitations 
Only companies listed on the JSE were included in this research due to restrictions 
regarding data collection. 
CEOs with a tenure of 4 or more years during the time period across which this study 
is conducted were included following the research conducted by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007). 
 
3.3.3 Five-Item Narcissism Index (Independent Variable) 
Data relating to all 5 items on the narcissism index was obtained. As in the study 
conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) the premise has been adopted that 
one‟s degree of narcissism is relatively enduring and stable (Cramer, 1998; Campbell, 
Foster & Finkel, 2002; Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2005; Engelen, 
Neumann, & Schmidt, 2013 and O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, & Chatman, 2013). For 
this reason CEO narcissism was measured at one point in time (the average of the 
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CEO‟s second and third years of tenure) as applied by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007).  
 
3.3.3.1 Prominence of the CEO’s photograph 
The photograph of each CEO was obtained from the CEO‟s report in the relevant 
company‟s annual financial statements. The photo was then rated as follows: four 
points if the CEO‟s photo was of him/her alone and occupied more than half a page; 
three points if the photo was of the CEO alone and occupied less than half a page; two 
points if the CEO was photographed with one or more fellow executives; and one 
point if there was no photograph of the CEO. This photo was obtained from the 
published, audited financial statements which were downloaded from the relevant 
company‟s website. This follows the method applied by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) and Engelen, Neumann and Schmidt (2013). The average photograph scores 
and standard deviation of the photograph scores across all the CEOs were calculated. 
For each CEO, their photograph scores were standardised by taking the difference 
between their photograph score and the average photograph score, divided by the 
standard deviation of photograph scores. 
 
3.3.3.2 CEO’s prominence in company press releases 
Firstly verification of the level of involvement of the CEO in the press release, being 
either Stock Exchange News Service announcements or press releases that were 
archived on the company‟s website, was established. Discussions conducted by 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) with communications specialists revealed that each 
CEO had very stringent guidelines for external announcements and personally 
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reviewed all but the most routine issues. This report‟s verification procedures as 
discussed at the beginning of section 3, together with the findings from the Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) study resulted in the assumption that all press releases included 
in this sample were reviewed by and under the control of the CEO. 
 
Criteria for the selection of the press releases to be obtained for use in this study were 
then put in place. It was found that narcissistic CEOs would aim to be visible in 
positive press releases but invisible in releases of negative news (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Engelen, Neumann & Schidt, 2013). Speech has been found to be a 
form of expressive behaviour (Ramsay, 1968) and thus may be negatively influenced 
by the discussion of negative events. Press releases that related to neutral or positive 
events were thus selected, in line with the study conducted by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007).  
 
The press releases used were either Stock Exchange News Service announcements or 
press releases that were archived on the company‟s website. The Stock Exchange 
News Service (SENS) was established by the Issuer Services Division of the JSE and 
publishes company announcements and price sensitive company releases to the public. 
The sources of such press releases are thus deemed appropriate for this study. 
 
One press release from both the second and third year of the CEO‟s tenure was then 
selected according to the prescribed criteria, per the method applied by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) and Engelen, Neumann, and Schmidt (2013). For this measure, the 
number of times the CEO was mentioned by name in the company‟s press releases 
was counted. This total was then divided by the total number of words in all the 
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company press releases. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that the results were 
similar when they applied the total number of press releases as the denominator. 
The average press release scores and standard deviation of the press release scores 
across all the CEOs were calculated. For each CEO, their press release scores were 
standardised by taking the difference between their press release score and the average 
press release score, divided by the standard deviation of scores. 
 
3.3.3.3 CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns 
Transcripts of interviews of CEOs (conducted by journalists or financial analysts), 
isolating only those portions that represented the CEO‟s words were obtained from 
Moneyweb, a reputable online financial news service. Again, only interviews 
regarding positive or neutral events were used as speech is a form of expressive 
behaviour (Ramsay, 1968) and thus may be negatively influenced by the discussion of 
negative events. One interview from both the second and third year of the CEO‟s 
tenure was selected in accordance with the stipulated criteria. The number of first 
person singular pronouns (I, me, mine, my, myself) used by the CEO, divided by the 
sum of those pronouns plus all first person plural pronouns (we, us, our, ours, 
ourselves) was then counted. The measure is thus the percentage of all first person 
pronouns that were singular and was averaged for the second and third years of tenure 
to form this component of the index. This follows the method applied by Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) and Engle, Neumann and Schmidt (2013). 
 
The average interview scores and standard deviation of the interview scores across all 
the CEOs were calculated. For each CEO, their interview scores were standardised by 
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taking the difference between their interview score and the average score, divided by 
the standard deviation of interview scores. 
 
3.3.3.4 Measures of Relative Pay 
Following Hayward and Hambrick‟s (1997) measure of self-importance two measures 
of relative pay were used: Relative cash pay and relative non cash pay. Relative cash 
pay is the CEO‟s cash compensation (salary and bonus) divided by that of the second 
highest-paid executive in the firm.  
 
Relative non-cash pay is the CEO‟s non-cash compensation (deferred income and 
share options) divided by that of the second highest paid executive. Where a 
numerical total value of the share options was not provided and instead the details 
surrounding the share options was disclosed, the share options were valued using the 
Black-Scholes valuation technique. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) noted that their 
results did not change if they used the pay of the top four executives, excluding the 
CEO, in the denominators of their measures.  
 
Information regarding the remuneration of the CEO and directors was obtained from 
the remuneration report/notes to the financial statements from the relevant company‟s 
set of annual financial statements downloaded from their website. These measures 
were calculated for the second and third year of CEO tenure and averaged to calculate 
a relative measure. 
 
In the case of two CEOs included in the sample, only the CEO was awarded non-cash 
compensation and no non-cash compensation was awarded to the second highest paid 
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executive. As this skewed the data considerably the non-cash compensation for the 
highest paid executives from another company in the same industry were used as 
proxies for the second highest paid executives in the two companies included in the 
sample. 
 
To develop a score on the index the total of the final scores captured for each of the 
five measures, was used to develop a narcissism score for each CEO. The final score 
for narcissism was calculated by taking each of the standardised scores noted above 
and dividing by the number of factors in the composite score. This narcissism score 
averaged and applied to all company years that CEO serves, was applied as the 
independent variable in this study. 
 
The average relative pay scores and standard deviation of the relative pay scores 
across all the CEOs were calculated. For each CEO, their relative pay scores were 
standardised by taking the difference between their relative pay score and the average 
relative pay score, divided by the standard deviation of relative pay scores. 
 
3.3.4 Strategic Dynamism 
Advertising intensity (advertising expense/sales), plant and equipment newness (net 
plant and equipment/gross plant and equipment), research and development intensity 
(R&D expense/sales), overhead efficiency (selling, general, and administrative 
expense/sales), and financial leverage (total debt/equity) have been used as strategic 
dynamism indicators in prior research (Westphal, Seidel & Stewart (2001); Chatterjee 
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& Hambrick (2007)). Due to data availability relating to mergers and acquisitions as 
well as regarding disclosable items in the financial statements, plant and equipment 
newness, financial leverage and overhead efficiency were used to measure strategic 
dynamism. The first indicator used was plant and equipment newness, being the ratio 
of net plant and equipment to gross plant and equipment, which measures the 
company‟s capacity expansion activities. The second indicator was financial leverage, 
being the ratio of debt to equity, which measure the company‟s capital management. 
The final measure applied was that of overhead efficiency being the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses to sales, which represents the cost structure of the 
company. 
 
Where the ratios were available they were obtained from the McGregor BFA data 
base. Where the ratios were not available they were calculated using the line items 
from the published annual financial statements downloaded from the relevant 
company‟s website.  
 
In a study conducted by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) the change in indicators was 
calculated for each company between the prior year (t+n-1) and the focal year (t+n). 
Each indicator was then standardised over all observations (mean=0, s.d.=1) and 
finally the standardised indicators were summed to form a composite measure of 
strategic dynamism. This method was applied to the data in this study. 
This Strategic Dynamism variable serves as the dependent variable in this study. 
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3.3.5 Control Variables 
Data relating to control variables was also collected. Factors at three levels, namely 
CEO controls, company controls and industry controls were included and are detailed 
below.  
In a study conducted by Ham, Seybert and Wang (2013), it was examined if signature 
size, being a proxy for narcissism, exhibited a relationship with corporate investment, 
the number of patents and citations, abnormal investments and future sales, current 
firm performance as well as compensation. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
conducted a study to determine the effects that narcissistic CEOs have on company 
strategy and performance.  
 
The control variables in this study follow the approach adopted by Ham, Seybert and 
Wang (2013) and Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). The variables are split into three 
categories, as presented in the Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) study, namely CEO 
controls, firm controls and industry controls. Control variables were selected based on 
the availability of data and adapted for the South African context. 
 
3.3.5.1 CEO Controls  
CEO age and CEO tenure were controlled for. As narcissistic CEO‟s age and/or their 
tenure increases they tend to engage in grandiose or dynamic strategies (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007). 
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The CEO‟s age in years, the number of years the CEO has been in their position and 
gender were also included as control variables. Ham, Seybert and Wang (2013) 
included these latter three CEO characteristics to control for other sources of variation 
in CEO behaviour, and to capture other potential variation in CEO signatures. It was 
stated by the researchers that controlling for CEO age, tenure, and gender should aid 
them in assuming that any remaining differences in signature size are randomly 
distributed across CEOs. 
 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) stated that the tendency to engage in grandiose or 
dynamic strategies may vary with age or tenure, and thus controlled for CEO age and 
CEO tenure. To control for the CEO‟s structural power (Finkelstein, 1992), Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) coded whether the CEO was also board chairman. They also 
included a binary indicator of whether the firm had a COO or president other than the 
CEO, to capture whether the CEO delegated operational matters. These control 
variables were referred to as CEO controls in their study. 
 
In the original study by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) an indicator variable was 
used if the CEO was also chairman. As the code (Institute of Directors, 2009) does not 
permit the CEO to chair the board of directors and only JSE listed companies will be 
included in this study, this indicator variable has become redundant and thus was not 
included in this study.  
 
CEOs may be inclined to make certain strategic decisions dependent on state of 
economy and thus the economic phase of the South African economy was controlled 
for. The tenure periods were split between the different economic phases as shown via 
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analysis of the JSE and then controlled for by using indicator variables [Insert 
Appendix C]. The economic phases are defined as follows: 2000 and 2004 as constant 
(zero- low growth), 2005 and 2007 as a boom (exponential growth), 2008 as a 
recession (decline) and 2009 and 2012 as a recovery phase. 
 
An indicator variable for the presence of the Chief Operating Officer (COO) was 
included in the analysis to capture whether the CEO delegated operational matters. 
 
3.3.5.2 Company Controls 
To control for immediate resource availability, or slack, Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) included the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. The researchers also 
stated that because large and old firms may face bureaucratic momentum, they 
controlled for firm size age. These control variables were referred to as firm controls. 
 
Immediate resource availability, was controlled for by including the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities at t+n-1 as included in the study conducted by Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007). 
 
3.3.5.3 Industry Controls 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) controlled for the industry‟s central tendencies for 
each of their dependent variables by including the industry average (for all firms in the 
sample, always excluding the focal firm) in each year, for each dependent variable. 
The researchers included these controls, respectively, for each firm level dependent 
variable examined. They also included a dummy variable for our two industry sectors 
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(coded one for the computer sector).These control variables were referred to as 
industry controls in their study.  
 
CEOs across all JSE industries and not just the information technology sectors were 
included in the population for this study and thus all the JSE industries were assigned 
dummy variables, following the method used by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007). The 
industries that were represented in the final sample were identified to be as follows: 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Industrials, Technology, 
Telecommunications and Basic Materials. An indicator variable was used in the 
analysis to control for the existence of a company in a specific industry thus 
attempting to control for industry‟s central tendencies. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
The aim of this research was to determine if CEO narcissism has a significant 
influence on strategic dynamism, and the individual component of strategic 
dynamism, controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, firm age, resource availability, the 
presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during which the CEO served his tenure 
and the industry in which the company operates. 
 
A study was conducted by Ham, Seybert and Wang (2013) to determine if the 
signature size of a CEO is an indicator of narcissism. This study used multiple 
regression models to test the effect of CEO narcissism on the firm‟s investment 
policies, the level of investment in the presence of financial slack and the effect of 
CEO narcissism on the firm‟s innovative output via patent and citation counts. The 
48 
 
study by Ham, Seybert and Wang (2013) also tested whether narcissism affects the 
relation between current abnormal investment and future firm performance as 
measured by sales growth and sales levels in subsequent years following the abnormal 
investments, whether narcissism affects the relation between current abnormal 
investment and future firm performance as measured by sales growth and sales levels 
in subsequent years following the abnormal investments and lastly, tests whether more 
narcissistic CEOs are compensated differently.  
The study conducted by Ham, Seybert and Wang (20130), tested a relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables to address the relevant hypothesis, 
whilst taking into account numerous control variables. 
In order to address the hypothesis formulated in this study the appropriate statistical 
measure needed to be selected. Multiple regression was selected as the most 
appropriate statistic tool to test whether such a relationship exists. This follows prior 
research produced by (Biddle et al. 2009, Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 2013 and Ham 
et al. 2013). Regression tests and diagnostics run were guided by the manual produced 
by Chen, Ender, Michell and Wells (2003). The models for each of tests are presented 
in the sections below. 
 
3.4.1 Analysis of Variables 
Both the dependant and independent variables are measured at the continuous level. 
Control variables are also measured at the continuos level apart from the indicator 
variables applied, which are categorical.  
A plot of residuals to independent variables was observed and a linear relationship 
was identified. Histograms of all the variables were also generated in order to identify 
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any outliers. One observation was removed as result of this analysis. After the 
normality of the data used in this study was tested, and the regression models run, the 
normality of residuals was tested.  
Descriptive statistics were generated and analysed for the data set. This analysis 
revealed that some of the variables were not normally distributed and thus had to be 
transformed. A table and a detailed discussion of the descriptive statistics is presented 
in Chapter 4. Table 3.4.1.1 lists all the variables and their related labels in STATA and 
Table 2.4.1.2 reflects the methods used to transform the variables, which was executed 
using the ladder of powers method, to identify the most suitable method of 
transformation, in STATA (Tukey, 1977; Gould, 1992). The narcissism score 
exhibited a strong positive skew and thus could not be transformed; however this is 
addressed via the testing of the normality of the residuals. 
A Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed in order to establish the normality of the 
transformed data [Insert Table 4.2.2] and the correlation between variables were 
analysed for any significant relationships [Insert Table 4.2.3]. 
The multiple regression models set out in section 3.4.2 were run in STATA in order to 
test whether or not a relationship between the variables exits. The significance and 
variance explained (R-squared) of each model was considered in order to establish the 
existence of relationships. 
The variance inflation factor for each model was calculated to determine whether the 
variables exhibited multicollinearity. A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for 
heteroscedasticity was also performed for each of the models.  To determine which 
observations had the most significant influence over the results, a Cook‟s Distance test 
was performed followed by a Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test 
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(RESET) test (Ramsey, 1969), which reflects whether or not any variables have been 
omitted. For each model a link test was performed to ensure that the regression 
equations were properly specified and that no additional independent variables are 
significant above chance. Lastly, a SWilk W test was carried out for each regression 
model to ensure the normality of residuals. The results of these tests are discussed 
below in section 3.4.2 Regression Models. 
The control variables presence of a COO, phase of the economy and industry in which 
the company operates are all categorical. As a result dummy variables were used in 
the regression to represent these indicator variables. The coding applied is presented 
along with the list of variables in table 3.4.1.1. This methodology is supported by the 
methodology presented by UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group (n.d.). 
 
3.4.2 Regression Models 
The regression analysis was split into four models. The first model explores the 
relationship between narcissism and strategic dynamism whilst the three models that 
follow explore the relationship between narcissism and each of the three components 
of strategic dynamism separately. The advantage of using multiple regression over 
correlation is that it not only allows one to establish if there is a relationship and what 
form it takes, it also allows one to examine the strength of the predictors inserted into 
the model. A list of variables and their associated STATA labels is presented in Table 
3.4.1.1. 
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3.4.2.1 The Relationship between Narcissism and Strategic Dynamism 
The regression model below was used to determine whether or not a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the narcissism score and strategic dynamism. 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝐷𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚~𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛 +
 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑛 +  𝛽5𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡~𝑛 +  𝛽6𝐶 +  𝛽7𝐸 +  𝛽8𝐼 + 𝜀  
 
A full list of variables is presented in table 3.4.1.1 on page 98. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for this model to test for 
multicollinearity. The results in table 4.3.1.2 show that the VIF for all the variables 
was less than 10 and therefore no significant multicollinearity was exhibited in this 
model. It should also be noted that the control variables account for the highest VIF 
value, and the independent variable exhibits a relatively low score of 1.94. The mean 
VIF is 4.4 which further supports the statement that no significant multicollinearity 
exists (Allison, 2012).  
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was performed to test for heteroscedasticity 
within the model. The prob>Chi
2
 value amounted to 0.7706. As this value is greater 
than 0.1 it suggests that there is no heteroscedasticity within the model. These results 
are presented in 4.3.1.3.  
Identification of observations that had a significant influence over the results was 
facilitated by performing a Cook‟s Distance test. The results displayed in table 4.3.1.4 
reveal that observations from company 4 and company 3 had a significant influence 
over the results and were thus adjusted via the removal of outliers.  
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The results of the Ramsey RESET test presented in table 4.3.1.5 showed that the 
model did not omit any variables. The hatsq value reflected in the results from 
performing the link test, which are presented in table 4.3.1.6, is 0.968. This value is 
greater than 0.1 and thus no additional independent variables should be significant 
above chance. The results from the Ramsey RESET test and the link test indicate that 
the model is well specified. 
Lastly, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed over the residuals to establish their 
normality. The residuals exhibit a p-value of 0.37642. This value is non-significant 
providing evidence of normality. 
 
3.4.2.2 The Relationship between Narcissism and Financial Leverage 
The regression model below was used to determine whether or not a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the narcissism score and once component of 
strategic dynamism; financial leverage. 
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦~𝑛 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚~𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛 +
 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑛 +  𝛽5𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡~𝑛 +  𝛽6𝐶 +  𝛽7𝐸 +  𝛽8𝐼 + 𝜀  
 
A full list of variables is presented in table 3.4.1.1 which can be found on page 98. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for this model to test for 
multicollinearity. The results in table 4.3.2.2 show that the VIF for all the variables 
was less than 10 and therefore no significant multicollinearity was exhibited in this 
model. It should also be noted that the control variables account for the highest VIF 
values, and the independent variable exhibits a relatively low score of 1.83. The mean 
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VIF is 4.59 which further supports the statement that no significant multicollinearity 
exists (Allison, 2012).  
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was performed to test for heteroscedasticity 
within the model. The prob>Chi
2
 value amounted to 0.9742. As this value is greater 
than 0.1 it suggests that there is no heteroscedasticity within the model. These results 
are presented in 4.3.2.3.  
Identification of variables that had a significant influence over the results was 
facilitated by performing a Cook‟s Distance test. The results displayed in table 4.3.2.4 
reveal that observations from companies 1, 2 and 4 had a significant influence over 
the results and were thus adjusted via the removal of outliers.  
The results of the Ramsey RESET test presented in table 4.3.2.5 showed that the 
model did not omit any variables. The hatsq value reflected in the results from 
performing the link test, which are presented in table 4.3.1.6, is 0.108. This value is 
greater than 0.1 and thus no additional independent variables should be significant 
above chance. The results from the Ramsey RESET test and the link test indicate that 
the model is well specified. 
Lastly, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed over the residuals to establish their 
normality. The residuals exhibit a p-value of 0.87848. This value is non-significant 
providing evidence of normality   
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3.4.2.3 The Relationship between Narcissism and Overhead Efficiency 
The regression model below was used to determine whether or not a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the narcissism score and once component of 
strategic dynamism; overhead efficiency. 
𝑠𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚~𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛 +
 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑛 +  𝛽5𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡~𝑛 +  𝛽6𝐶 +  𝛽7𝐸 +  𝛽8𝐼 + 𝜀  
 
A full list of variables is presented in table 3.4.1.1 which is presented on page 98. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for this model to test for 
multicollinearity. The results in table 4.3.3.2 show that the VIF for all the variables 
was less than 10 and therefore no significant multicollinearity was exhibited in this 
model. It should also be noted that the control variables account for the highest VIF 
values, and the independent variable exhibits a relatively low score of 1.84. The mean 
VIF is 4.56 which further supports the statement that no significant multicollinearity 
exists (Allison, 2012). 
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was performed to test for heteroscedasticity 
within the model. The prob>Chi
2
 value amounted to 0.5190. As this value is greater 
than 0.1 it suggests that there is no heteroscedasticity within the model. These results 
are presented in 4.3.3.3.  
Identification of variables that had a significant influence over the results was 
facilitated by performing a Cook‟s Distance test. The results displayed in table 4.3.3.4 
reveal that observations from companies 1, 2 and 9 had a significant influence over 
the results and were thus adjusted via the removal of outliers.  
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The results of the Ramsey RESET test presented in table 4.3.3.5 showed that the 
model did not omit any variables. The hatsq value reflected in the results from 
performing the link test, which are presented in table 4.3.3.6, is 0.371. This value is 
greater than 0.1 and thus no additional independent variables should be significant 
above chance. The results from the Ramsey RESET test and the link test indicate that 
the model is well specified. 
Lastly, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed over the residuals to establish their 
normality. The residuals exhibit a p-value of 0.2668. This value is non-significant 
providing evidence of normalitythus reveals clear evidence of normality. 
 
3.4.2.4 The Relationship between Narcissism and Plant and Equipment Newness 
The regression model below was used to determine whether or not a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the narcissism score and once component of 
strategic dynamism; plant and equipment newness. 
FAAtTA=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑚~𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽3𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑛 +
 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑛 +  𝛽5𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡~𝑛 +  𝛽6𝐶 +  𝛽7𝐸 +  𝛽8𝐼 + 𝜀  
A full list of variables is presented in table 3.4.1.1 which is presented on page 98. 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated for this model to test for 
multicollinearity. The results in table 4.3.4.2 show that the VIF for all the variables 
was less than 10 and therefore no significant multicollinearity was exhibited in this 
model. It should also be noted that the control variables account for the highest VIF 
values, and the independent variable exhibits a relatively low score of 1.83.  The mean 
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VIF is 4.59 which further supports this statement that no significant multicollinearity 
exists (Allison, 2012). 
A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was performed to test for heteroscedasticity 
within the model. The prob>Chi
2
 value amounted to 0.1448. As this value is greater 
than 0.1 it suggests that there is no heteroscedasticity within the model. These results 
are presented in 4.3.4.3.  
Identification of variables that had a significant influence over the results was 
facilitated by performing a Cook‟s Distance test. The results displayed in table 4.3.4.4 
reveal that observations from companies 4 and 5 had a significant influence over the 
results and were thus adjusted via the removal of outliers.  
The results of the Ramsey RESET test presented in table 4.3.4.5 showed that the 
model did not omit any variables. The hatsq value reflected in the results from 
performing the link test, which are presented in table 4.3.4.6, is 0.0.139. This value is 
greater than 0.1 and thus no additional independent variables should be significant 
above chance. The results from the Ramsey RESET test and the link test indicate that 
the model is well specified. 
Lastly, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was performed over the residuals to establish their 
normality. The residuals exhibit a p-value of 0.08394 which is close 0.1 and greater 
than 0.05. This value is non-significant providing evidence of normality.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the methods used in this study. The hypothesis was 
presented first followed by an explanation of the instrument used to evaluate the level 
of narcissism in CEOs. The delimitations of the study were then mentioned as well as 
a description of how the data was collected for each item of the narcissism index, the 
components of the strategic dynamism measure and the control variables. This chapter 
established that multiple regression would be used in order to determine whether there 
was a statistically significant relationship between narcissism and strategic dynamism 
and each of the three individual components. All the statistical tests and processes 
applied to the data were also discussed in this chapter. In chapter 4 the results of the 
statistical tests outlined in this chapter will be presented and discussed. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Research Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This section displays all of the results obtained in this study. The descriptive statistics, 
test for normality and correlation coefficients generated by STATA are presented and 
discussed first. The results of each regression model presented in section 4.3 
Exploration of Model Relationships and are then discussed in section 4.4 Discussion 
of Model Relationship. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Diagnostic Tests 
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.3 and 4.3.3 present and discuss the descriptive statistics and further 
diagnostic tests run on the data used in this study. 
 
4.2.1 Analysis of Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.2.1 below displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variable, 
dependent variables and control variables, which are not indicator variables, applied in 
this study. It can be seen that 85 observations were included for testing. The data was 
transformed using the ladder of powers method to identify the optimal transformation 
method, as discussed in section 3.4.1. 
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Table 4.2.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
strategicd~m 85 0.04 2.23 -5.57 16.68 
narcissism~e 85 -0.03 2.77 -2.52 11.34 
debtequity~o 85 1.15 0.97 0.11 5.95 
sgasales 83 37.39 26.27 2.49 97.25 
fixedasste~s 85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ceoage 85 50.39 6.73 36.5 63 
firmage 85 47.57 34.67 5.5 121 
currentratio 85 1.69 0.76 0.59 4.07 
ceotenure 85 4.91 2.07 1.5 11 
 
4.2.2 Normality of Data 
After the variables presented in table 3.4.1.2 on page 98 had been transformed using 
the most appropriated method identified by using the ladder of powers method in 
STATA, the Shapiro-Wilk W test was conducted to test the normality of the data. 
Table 4.2.2 below displays the results of this test. It is shown that narcissism~e and 
firmAge_ln reflect a p-value less than 0.01, however the Shapiro-WilkW tests run 
over the residuals of all of the regression models in this study exhibited normality 
[Insert tables 4.3.1.7, 4.3.2.7, 4.3.3.7 and 4.3.4.7].  
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Table 4.2.2 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for Normal Data 
  Variable Obs W V Z Prob>z 
StrDy_inv 83 0.97 2.045 1.57 0.06 
narcissism~e 83 0.75 17.64 6.30 0.00 
ceoage 83 0.98 1.64 1.09 0.14 
firmAge_ln 83 0.95 3.52 2.76 0.00 
ceoTenure_ln 83 0.98 1.22 0.44 0.33 
debtequity~n 83 0.99 0.88 -0.28 0.61 
sgasale_sqrt 81 0.96 2.78 2.24 0.01 
FAAtTA 83 0.98 1.29 0.57 0.29 
currentrat~n 83 0.99 0.89 -0.26 0.60 
 
4.2.3 Correlation Coefficients 
The correlation coefficients of the dependent and independent variables as well as the 
control variables which are not indicator variables are presented below in table 4.2.3. 
Upon examination of these results it can be seen that there is a significant (at a 10% 
level) moderate negative relationship between narcissism and CEO tenure; the same is 
observed for the relationship between narcissism and immediate resource availability. 
This indicates that the higher the narcissism score the lower the CEO tenure and the 
lower the resource availability. This could mean that narcissistic CEOs tend to serve 
for shorter periods of time and less resources immediately available which could 
indicate that they adopt a less prudent approach. This supports the research conducted 
by Hribar and Yang (2013). 
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Table 4.2.3 
Correlation Coefficients 
     narcis~e ceoage firmAg~n ceoTen~n curren~n 
narcissism~e 1 
   
  
ceoage 0.21 1 
  
  
firmAge_ln 0.19 0.20 1 
 
  
ceoTenure_ln -0.43* 0.15 0.18 1   
currentrat~n -0.31* -0.19 0.18 0.05 1 
 
*Significant correlation exhibited 
4.3 Exploration of Model Relationships 
This section explores whether or not there is a statistically significant relationship 
between narcissism and strategic dynamism and each of the components of strategic 
dynamism separately. For each model the significance and results of the model are 
presented below. The information generated by the diagnostic tests run with respect to 
each of the models is discussed in section 3.4.2 Regression Models. A discussion of 
the model relationships is presented in section 4.4 Discussion of Model Relationships. 
 
4.3.1 Strategic Dynamism 
The results of the regression model testing whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between narcissism and strategic dynamism are presented in table 4.3.1.1 
below. The p-value of 0.2199 shows that the model is not significant at the 10% level. 
As a result each of the components of strategic dynamism were also tested to 
determine whether there is a relationship between narcissism and the individual 
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components of strategic dynamism. The r-squared of the model is 0.053 suggesting 
that 5.3% of variance in strategic dynamism is explained by the independent variables. 
This regression model has been tested for outliers. Where outliers were discovered 
they were removed thus resulting in 80 observations included in this model. Consumer 
goods exhibits a p-value of 0.120, consumer services exhibits a p-value of 0.140 and 
telecommunications exhibits a p-value of 0.167. Whilst these three variables reflected 
the smallest p-values, they do not provide evidence of a relationship with strategic 
dynamism. 
Table 4.3.1.1 
Results - Strategic Dynamism 
   StrDy_inv Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
narcissismscore 0.001 0.001 1.010 0.315 
ceoage 0.000 0.000 0.710 0.482 
firmAge_ln -0.005 0.004 -1.240 0.221 
ceoTenure_ln 0.008 0.009 0.900 0.373 
currentratio_ln -0.003 0.007 -0.450 0.653 
coo -0.004 0.014 -0.280 0.784 
exponential20052007 -0.012 0.015 -0.840 0.406 
recession2008 -0.016 0.016 -1.000 0.320 
recovery20092014 0.004 0.015 0.290 0.775 
consumergoods 0.024 0.015 1.580 0.120 
consumerservices 0.024 0.016 1.500 0.140 
industrials 0.022 0.016 1.400 0.167 
telecommunications 0.007 0.023 0.290 0.776 
basicmaterials 0.018 0.015 1.220 0.229 
_cons 0.132 0.028 4.680 0.000 
  
   
  
Number of obs = 80 
 
  
Prob > F = 0.2199 
 
  
R-squared = 0.2215 
 
  
Adj R-squared = 0.0538     
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 4.3.2 Financial Leverage 
The results of the regression model testing whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between narcissism and a component of strategic dynamism, financial 
leverage, are presented in table 4.3.2.1 below. The p-value value of 0.000 shows that 
the model is significant at the 1% level which suggests that the independent variables 
reliably predict the variance in the dependent variable. The r-squared of the model is 
0.56 suggesting that 56% of variance in financial leverage is explained by the 
independent variables. This regression model has been tested for outliers. Where 
outliers were discovered they were removed thus resulting in 85 observations included 
in this model.  
CEO age, CEO tenure, resource availability, and the industrial sector all reflected p-
values of 0.000 providing very strong evidence that these variables influence financial 
leverage. The narcissism score exhibited a p-value of 0.0080 whilst CEO age 
exhibited a p-value of 0.0130 also providing very strong evidence that the narcissism 
score and CEO age significantly influence financial leverage.  
The consumer goods sector reflected a p-value of 0.0480 and the telecommunications 
sector reflected a p-value of 0.0490 providing evidence that these sectors exhibit a 
significant relationship with financial leverage.  
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Table 4.3.2.1 
Results - Financial Leverage 
   debtequity_ln Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Narcissismscore -0.081 0.030 -2.750 0.008 
Ceoage 0.046 0.011 4.300 0.000 
firmAge_ln -0.073 0.102 -0.720 0.477 
ceoTenure_ln -1.118 0.213 -5.260 0.000 
currentratio_ln -0.835 0.160 -5.220 0.000 
Coo -0.131 0.344 -0.380 0.706 
exponential20052007 0.369 0.356 1.040 0.304 
recession2008 0.625 0.392 1.590 0.115 
recovery20092014 0.911 0.359 2.540 0.013 
Consumergoods 0.736 0.366 2.010 0.048 
Consumerservices 0.448 0.388 1.160 0.252 
Industrials 1.689 0.386 4.370 0.000 
telecommunications 1.121 0.560 2.000 0.049 
Basicmaterials 0.349 0.367 0.950 0.345 
_cons -1.731 0.686 -2.520 0.014 
  
   
  
Number of obs = 85 
 
  
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
  
R-squared = 0.635 
 
  
Adj R-squared = 0.562     
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4.3.3 Overhead Efficiencies 
The results of the regression model testing whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between narcissism and a component of strategic dynamism, overhead 
efficiency, are presented in table 4.3.3.1 below. The p-value reflects as 0.000 showing 
that the model is significant at the 1% level which suggests that the independent 
variables reliably predict the variance in the dependent variable. The r-squared of the 
model is 0.77 suggesting that 77% of variance in the overhead efficiencies is 
explained by the independent variables. This regression model has been tested for 
outliers. Where outliers were discovered they were removed thus resulting in 80 
observations included in this model.  
CEO tenure, resource availability, the consumer goods sector, the industrial sector and 
the basic materials sector all have a p-value of 0 providing very strong evidence that 
they exhibit a significant relationship with overhead efficiency. The 
telecommunications industry has a p-value of 0.001, the recovery phase of the 
economy has a p-value 0.003 and the presence of a COO has a p-value of 0.005, 
providing very strong evidence that these three variables also have a significant 
relationship with overhead efficiency.  
CEO age reflects a p-value of 0.012 and firm age reflects a p-value of 0.039 providing 
evidence that there is a significant relationship present between these two variables 
and overhead efficiency.  
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Table 4.3.3.1 
Results - Overhead Efficiency 
   sgasale_sqrt Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Narcissismscore -0.055 0.052 -1.060 0.291 
Ceoage 0.049 0.019 2.570 0.012 
firmAge_ln 0.380 0.180 2.110 0.039 
ceoTenure_ln -1.638 0.370 -4.430 0.000 
currentratio_ln -1.396 0.288 -4.840 0.000 
Coo 2.086 0.717 2.910 0.005 
exponential20052007 0.922 0.622 1.480 0.143 
recession2008 1.208 0.680 1.780 0.080 
recovery20092014 1.903 0.623 3.050 0.003 
Consumergoods -3.595 0.642 -5.600 0.000 
Consumerservices -0.854 0.674 -1.270 0.210 
Industrials -2.763 0.676 -4.090 0.000 
telecommunications -3.748 1.049 -3.570 0.001 
Basicmaterials -5.924 0.639 -9.270 0.000 
_cons 6.622 1.195 5.540 0.000 
  
   
  
Number of obs = 80 
 
  
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
  
R-squared = 0.810 
 
  
Adj R-squared = 0.770     
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4.3.4 Plant and Equipment Newness 
The results of the regression model testing whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between narcissism and a component of strategic dynamism, plant and 
equipment newness, are presented in table 4.3.4.1 below. The p-value reflects as 0.001 
showing that the model is significant at the 1% level which suggests that the 
independent variables reliably predict the variance in the dependent variable. The r-
squared of the model is 0.31 suggesting that 31% of variance in the plant and 
equipment newness is explained by the independent variables. This regression model 
has been tested for outliers. Where outliers were discovered they were removed thus 
resulting in 80 observations included in this model.  
CEO age reflects a p-value of 0.002 and the narcissism score reflects a p-value of 
0.009, providing very strong evidence that these two variables exhibit a significant 
relationship with plant and equipment newness. Resource availability has a p-value of 
0.014 providing strong evidence that it has a significant relationship with plant and 
equipment newness.  
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Table 4.3.4.1 
Results - Plant and Equipment Newness 
  FAAtTA Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
Narcissismscore -0.143 0.053 -2.680 0.009 
Ceoage -0.063 0.019 -3.270 0.002 
firmAge_ln -0.172 0.183 -0.940 0.352 
ceoTenure_ln -0.700 0.383 -1.830 0.072 
currentratio_ln -0.723 0.288 -2.510 0.014 
Coo 0.463 0.620 0.750 0.458 
exponential20052007 0.497 0.642 0.770 0.441 
recession2008 1.201 0.706 1.700 0.093 
recovery20092014 0.681 0.647 1.050 0.297 
Consumergoods -0.751 0.660 -1.140 0.259 
Consumerservices -0.486 0.699 -0.700 0.489 
Industrials -0.149 0.696 -0.210 0.831 
telecommunications -0.582 1.009 -0.580 0.566 
Basicmaterials -0.005 0.661 -0.010 0.994 
_cons -5.223 1.235 -4.230 0.000 
  
   
  
Number of obs = 85 
 
  
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
  
R-squared = 0.424 
 
  
Adj R-squared = 0.308     
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4.4 Discussion of Model Relationships 
Researchers in a variety of academic fields including strategic management (Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004), organizational theory (Palmer & Barber, 2001), psychology (Peterson, 
Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003) and finance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) have 
shown considerable interest in understanding the effects of top executives on their 
organizations in recent years. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) noted that almost no 
scholarly attention has been paid to the personality trait they purport that most vividly 
comes to mind in describing some CEOs, which is narcissism.  
 
This study has drawn upon contemporary psychological theory and research to argue 
that narcissism in CEOs is a personality dimension, rather than only a pathological 
disorder (Kets de Vries, 2004). This study has also focussed on the effects that 
narcissistic CEOs have on the companies they run, through their concrete decisions, 
generate different company strategies and performance profiles than do their less 
narcissistic counterparts. 
 
The results of this study show that there is no significant relationship between 
narcissism and strategic dynamism and narcissism and overhead efficiency with 
regard to JSE listed companies. It is also shown that there is a significant relationship 
between narcissism and financial leverage, as well as narcissism and plant and 
equipment newness, which are two components of strategic dynamism. 
 
A possible explanation for this is the corporate governance structures in place over 
JSE listed companies. JSE listed companies are required to comply with The Code 
(Institute of Directors, 2009) which aims to encourage a balance of power amongst the 
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board of directors thus diluting the influence a CEO may have. These results suggest 
that whilst narcissistic CEOs influence two components of strategic dynamism, 
overall they do not have significant influence over the strategic dynamism of the 
company.  
 
Following from the theoretical argument that narcissistic CEOs favour actions that 
attract an attentive audience, considerable evidence has been found by Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2007) that CEO narcissism is positively related to multiple indicators of 
strategic dynamism and grandiosity. While less narcissistic CEOs may be inclined to 
pursue strategies adopting an incremental implementation and that entail refining and 
elaborating on the status quo, narcissistic CEOs gravitate to more extreme choices. 
Investing in plant and equipment as well as making radical decisions regarding capital 
structure would garner much more attention than overhead efficiencies providing an 
explanation as to why financial leverage and plant and equipment newness are 
influenced by narcissism but not overhead efficiency. These findings add to the 
evidence that company strategies are highly susceptible to human factors (Finkelstein 
&Hambrick, 1996; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003), and they particularly highlight the role 
of CEO narcissism in generating bold strategies.  
 
The results from this research further support the research performed by in indicating 
that the personality traits of CEO, focussing on narcissism, have an effect on aspects 
of the company these CEOs run.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
The regression model testing for significant relationships between the narcissism score 
and strategic dynamism did not yield any strong evidence that such a relationship 
exists. The results from the regression models exploring the existence of a relationship 
between the narcissism score and the individual components of strategic dynamism 
did however provide evidence of statistically significant relationships between the 
variables. 
 
There was very strong evidence to suggest that there is a significant relationship 
between narcissism and financial leverage as well as narcissism and plant and 
equipment newness.  
 
This chapter has presented statistically significant relationships between narcissism 
and two components of strategic dynamism, financial leverage and plant and 
equipment newness.  
The discussion of these results reflects that the finding of no significant relationship 
between narcissism and strategic dynamism is not consistent with prior studies. It is 
noted however that this study has been conducted using JSE listed companies whilst 
prior literature deals with international and mostly American studies.  
The significant relationship between narcissism and the two components of strategic 
dynamism, financial leverage and plant and equipment newness, supports the findings 
of prior studies that narcissistic CEOs are more likely to make radical changes as 
opposed to incremental changes.  
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These results also support the research that indicates that the personality traits of 
CEOs have an effect on the companies they run. These results will be further 
contextualised in chapter 5, which also provides an overall conclusion for this 
research report. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Discussion of Results and Recommendations 
This study of CEOs of a sample of JSE listed companies provides partial support for 
the hypotheses (H2 and H4) there is a significant relationship between CEO narcissism 
and two components of strategic dynamism, financial leverage and plant and 
equipment newness. 
 
The unobtrusive measures of narcissism compiled to form the 5-item narcissism index 
appear to have generated an adequate narcissism measure which was then be used to 
establish the existence of the relationship between the level of a CEO‟s narcissism and 
the strategic dynamism of that particular company. 
 
From the results analysis there appears to be a relationship between narcissism and 
two components of strategic dynamism taking into account which phase of the 
economy the CEO served his tenure in, the age of the CEO, resource availability, the 
age of the firm, the presence of a COO and the industry in which the company is 
operating. It therefore appears that boards should give consideration to narcissism as 
one of the factors used to choose CEO‟s. This supports the findings of the study 
carried out by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) that revealed a relationship between 
narcissism and strategic dynamism. These results also support studies by Malmendier 
and Tate (2005), Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) and Olsen (2011) that CEO 
personality traits have an effect on the outcomes achieve by the company.  
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Investors should determine their risk profile and investment goals before deciding 
upon a company in which to invest. In order to aid this decision the level of CEO 
narcissism should be considered as it has been shown to impact the degree of change 
in strategic dynamism These results should be considered in conjunction with findings 
of Campbell, Goodie and Foster (2004) how discovered that narcissists have been 
found to make riskier decisions. 
Beyond the theoretical contribution to this study of the effects of CEO personality on 
strategic outcomes, this study also makes a methodological contribution. As a result of 
the reliance on unobtrusive trace indicators of narcissistic tendencies, the well-known 
difficulties of administering personality batteries to CEOs were overcome. This 
supports the use of the indicators of various facets of the narcissistic personality 
developed by Chatterjee and Hambrick 92007). This method provided a template for 
using unobtrusive indicators of other personality dimensions in CEOs, and these 
results provides further support for research on narcissism in CEOs using unobtrusive 
factors. 
. 
The presence of a COO has shown to have a significant effect only on the overhead 
efficiency of the company and not on the other two components of strategic dynamism 
or on the composite measure of strategic dynamism. This reveals that even when 
CEOs delegate their operational responsibilities, their influence over the company 
does not appear to be diluted by a significant amount. This is a significant finding in 
terms of corporate governance structures in South Africa as it appears that the aim of 
attaining a balance of power within the company‟s leadership may not be met. These 
findings can be used to support the argument put forward by Amernic and Craig 
(2010) that as narcissism has been found to lie at the heart of leadership (Kets de 
Vries, 2004), it appears that a better understanding of narcissism and could lead to 
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better explanations of the involvement of CEOs in episodes of misleading and 
unethical financial reporting that have been implicated in corporate collapses. 
 
5.2 Research Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
The most notable limitation in this study is the use of these unobtrusive measures of 
narcissism. It has been argued that CEOs have considerable influence over the factors 
used in this index; however it is possible that characteristics other than CEO 
narcissism are influencing these factors. It is also possible that the factors expose 
some aspects of narcissism more than others and therefore even though the 5-item 
index has been found by Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) to have face validity, 
statistically cohere and yield an index that predicts logically expected outcomes; it still 
requires further validation and refinement. Whilst the most accurate results would be 
obtained by using direct measures of narcissism, such as the CEOs themselves 
completing NPI assessments, the likelihood of obtaining such data is extremely low. 
Further research should be carried out by replicating this study on many other samples 
and in light of the above mentioned limitation an attempt should be made to determine 
the correlation between the results of this study and the CEO‟s scores from an NPI 
assessment. As mentioned it would be impractical to assume such data would be 
readily obtainable, however it may be possible to obtain NPI ratings on CEOs from 
their close subordinates or others. Such an exercise would confirm the validity of the 
5-item index and would also indicate the positioning of the CEOs in this sample on 
the NPI scale. The CEOs in this sample displayed a variance on the narcissism 
measure, but it cannot be ascertained, compared to the general population, if the 
sample was skewed or restricted in its range. 
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When verifying the level of the CEO‟s involvement in the unobtrusive measures of 
narcissism to be used in the index only 7 CEOs in the sample confirmed that they had 
significant influence over the inputs. This research would benefit from using a sample 
of CEOs that had all confirmed that they have a significant amount of influence over 
the factors included in the 5-item index. 
 
It was also noted in the literature that narcissists may be drawn to certain types of 
industries (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). The results show that the type of industry 
in which the company operates has a significant interaction with narcissism when 
analysing the combined effect on the strategic dynamism of the company. It thus 
appears that it would be beneficial to conduct a study with a large sample for each 
industry to measure the correlation of narcissism and strategic dynamism in each 
specific industry.  
 
It would be informative for a study to be conducted examining the effect that the 
structural requirements imposed on organisations in South Africa via The Code 
(Institute of Directors, 2009) have on permeation of CEO‟s personality traits into the 
organisation. Whilst the requirements remove a certain portion of power from the 
CEO, the CEO may have such a powerful effect on those around him that he still may 
be able to influence the decisions of other people by such an extent that the objectives 
set out by The Code (Institute of Directors, 2009) are nullified and thus a balance of 
power does not exist. Conversely research in this area may provide support for the 
implementation of governance structures as the dilution of power may be evident. 
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Annually Ernst & Young, one of the big 4 accounting firms, releases a report grading 
the reporting quality of the top 100 listed companies on the JSE, by market 
capitalisation.  Through this survey, Ernst & Young has assessed the progress that the 
top listed companies and state-owned entities that have made in producing integrated 
reports (Ernst & Young, 2012). The companies are graded as “excellent”, “good” or 
“progress still to be made” and two of the companies included in the sample of CEOs 
examined in this study were in the top 100 and rated as having a “good” integrated 
report. As the unobtrusive measures are extracted from company financial statements, 
future studies conducted in South Africa may need to consider the ranking of the 
quality of the financial reports of the companies included in the sample in order to 
maximise the reliability of the information obtained from the annual financial 
statements of companies.  
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
The results of studies of CEO personality traits and their effects on the companies for 
which the CEOs work, significantly affect financial leverage and plant and equipment 
newness. The benefits of understanding the aspects of this relationship could influence 
the way people invest and the compositions on company boards and committees. 
Some literature goes so far as to state that a better understanding of narcissism, can 
lead to better explanations of the involvement of CEOs in episodes of misleading and 
unethical financial reporting that have been implicated in corporate collapses 
(Amernic & Craig, 2010). 
 
From the literature and the results of this study it can be seen that the personality traits 
of CEOs do have an impact on the companies they work for. As personality is such a 
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complex concept it is important to continue studying these effects in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the working environment and how that ultimately effects the 
financial performance and in turn the stakeholders of that company and the society in 
which that company is a corporate citizen. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Black Scholes Formula 
Folger (2013) 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Unobtrusive Indicators of Narcissism in CEOs 
       Conceptual Elements of Narcissism (from Emmons, 1987) 
  Leadership/ Self-absorption/ Superiority/ Exploitativeness/ 
  Authority Self-admiration Arrogance Entitlement 
Illustrative Items From I really like to be the centre I like to look at myself in the I usually dominate any I insist on getting the respect 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory of attention. mirror. conversation. that is due to me. 
(NPI) I like having authority over I am an extraordinary person. I am a born leader. I am envious of other people‟s 
  other people     good fortune. 
     Unobtrusive Indicators Interpretive Alignment With Elements of Narcissism 
of Narcissism in CEOs         
Prominence of CEO‟s I am the central figure in I enjoy the visibility that   I deserve to be showcased. 
Photograph in Annual Reports this company. comes with being CEO.     
CEO Prominence in Press I am the central figure in I enjoy the visibility that   I deserve to be showcased. 
Releases this company. comes with being CEO.     
First Person Singular Pronouns Leadership is a solo   The company and I are I deserve to be showcased. 
in Interviews endeavor, not a group   synonymous.   
  activity.       
CEO Relative Pay     I am, by far, the most valuable I deserve far more 
(cash and non-cash)     person in this organization. compensation than anyone 
        else in this organization. 
     
    
Chatterjee & Hambrick (2007) 
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Table 3.4.1.1 
List of Variables 
 Variable STATA Label 
Dependent Variable   
Level of Narcissism narcissism~e 
Independent Variables   
Strategic Dynamism StrDy_inv 
Financial Leverage debtequity~n 
Overhead Efficiency sgasale_sqrt 
Plant and Equipment Newness FAAtTA 
Control Variables   
CEO Age ceoage 
CEO Tenure ceoTenure_ln 
Firm Age firmAge_ln 
Resource Availability currentrat~n 
Indicator Variables   
Presence of a COO (C )   
Yes 1 
No 2 
Phase of the Economy (E)   
Constant  1 
Boom  2 
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Recovery 4 
Industry (I)   
Consumer Goods 1 
Consumer Services 2 
Financials 3 
Industrials 4 
Technology 5 
Telecommunications 6 
Basic Materials 7 
Error terms 𝜀 
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Table 3.4.1.2 
Transformation of Variables 
 
Variable 
Transformation 
Method 
StrDy_inv Inverse 
debtequity~n Log 
sgasale_sqrt Square Root 
FAAtTA Log 
Ceoage Not Required 
ceoTenure_ln Log 
firmAge_ln Log 
currentrat~n Log 
 
Table 4.3.1.2 
Test of Mulitcollinearity - Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rec~20092014 8.18 0.1222770 
Industrials 7.63 0.1310140 
exp~20052007 6.86 0.1458460 
consumergo~s 6.71 0.1491380 
basicmater~s 6.36 0.1572570 
telecommun~s 5.65 0.1769700 
consumerse~s 4.76 0.2099910 
recessi~2008 3.99 0.2507960 
Coo 3.09 0.3234310 
ceoTenure_ln 2.27 0.4406180 
narcissism~e 1.94 0.5147030 
firmAge_ln 1.80 0.5543770 
Ceoage 1.47 0.6822820 
currentrat~n 1.41 0.7073750 
  
 
  
Mean VIF 4.44   
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Table 4.3.1.3 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance     
Variables: fitted values of StrDy_inv 
  
  
  
  
chi2(1)      =     0.09 
 
  
Prob > chi2  =   0.7706    
 
 
Table 4.3.1.4 
Cook's Distance 
    code narcis~e CookSt~2 
24 Company 1 -1.527 0.394814 
70 Company 2 -1.527 0.144453 
71 Company 2 0.455 0.322402 
73 Company 3 -0.536 0.055346 
77 Company 4 -0.536 0.097318 
80 Company 4 -0.536 0.064683 
83 Company 4 -0.536 21.731 
84 Company 4 -1.207 0.074293 
 
 
Table 4.3.1.5 
Test for Omitted Variables 
   Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of StrDy_inv 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  
  
F(3, 62) =      0.19 
   
  
Prob > F =      0.9026       
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Table 4.3.1.6 
Link Test 
        
Source SS df 
M
S           
Model 
0.00956546
7 2 0 
  
Number of 
obs = 80 
Residual 
0.03361487
2 77 0 
  
F(  2,    77) = 10.96 
Total 
0.04318033
9 79 0 
  
Prob > F = 0.0001 
  
     
R-squared = 0.2215 
StrDy_in
v Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.2013 
_hat 0.7696768 5.640021 0.1 
0.89
2 
 
Root MSE = 
0.0208
9 
_hatsq 0.7381903 18.0634 0 
0.96
8 
   
  
_cons 0.0178764 
0.438727
7 0 
0.96
8         
 
Table 4.3.1.7 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for the Normality of Residuals 
 Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
resStrDy2 80 0.98318 1 0.315 0.37642 
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Table 4.3.2.2 
Test of Mulitcollinearity - Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rec~20092014 8.72 0.11464 
industrials 7.62 0.13122 
exp~20052007 7.24 0.13805 
consumergo~s 6.85 0.14598 
basicmater~s 6.43 0.15559 
consumerse~s 6 0.16656 
telecommun~s 5.65 0.17695 
recessi~2008 3.99 0.25064 
coo 3.09 0.3241 
ceoTenure_ln 2.21 0.45323 
narcissism~e 1.83 0.54759 
firmAge_ln 1.77 0.5653 
ceoage 1.42 0.70328 
currentrat~n 1.37 0.72941 
  
 
  
Mean VIF 4.59   
 
 
Table 4.3.2.3 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance   
Variables: fitted values of debtequity_ln   
  
 
  
chi2(1)      =     0.00   
Prob > chi2  =   0.9742   
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Table 4.3.2.4 
Cook's Distance 
    code narcis~e CookSt~y 
5 Company 5 -0.536 . 
11 Company 6 -0.536 . 
21 Company 7 4.263 0.0601029 
24 Company 1 -1.527 1.754889 
44 Company 8 -0.536 0.0635892 
70 Company 2 -1.527 0.1186601 
71 Company 2 0.455 0.2593817 
73 Company 3 -0.536 0.1271413 
74 Company 3 -0.536 0.0938039 
80 Company 4 -0.536 0.059468 
83 Company 4 -0.536 17.16892 
85 Company 4 -2.21 0.0508208 
 
Table 4.3.2.5 
 
Test for Omitted Variables 
    Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of
debtequity_ln   
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  
  
F(3, 67) =      2.00 
    
  
Prob > F =      0.1221           
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Table 4.3.2.6 
Linktest 
        Source SS df MS           
Model 
38.342248
1 2 
19.171
1 
  
Number of 
obs = 85 
Residual 
20.988576
3 82 
0.2559
6 
  
F(  2,    82) = 74.9 
Total 
59.330824
4 84 
0.7063
2 
  
Prob > F = 0 
  
     
R-squared = 0.6462 
debtequity~
n Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
 
Adj R-
squared = 0.6376 
_hat 0.9532607 
0.0873
1 10.92 0 
 
Root MSE = 
0.5059
2 
_hatsq -0.13511 
0.0832
1 -1.62 
0.10
8 
   
  
_cons 0.0558473 
0.0665
1 0.84 
0.40
4         
 
Table 4.3.2.7 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for the Normality of 
Residuals 
  Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
resDE 85 0.99185 0.588 -1 0.87848 
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Table 4.3.3.2 
Test of Mulitcollinearity - Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rec~20092014 8.24 0.12136 
industrials 7.12 0.14049 
exp~20052007 6.82 0.14656 
consumergo~s 6.65 0.15038 
telecommun~s 6.57 0.15215 
consumerse~s 5.97 0.16755 
basicmater~s 5.89 0.16976 
coo 3.99 0.25062 
recessi~2008 3.97 0.25164 
ceoTenure_ln 2.2 0.45414 
narcissism~e 1.84 0.54222 
firmAge_ln 1.77 0.56533 
currentrat~n 1.43 0.69712 
ceoage 1.43 0.69881 
  
 
  
Mean VIF 4.56   
 
Table 4.3.3.3 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance     
Variables: fitted values of 
sgasale_sqrt 
 
  
  
  
  
chi2(1)      =     0.42 
 
  
Prob > chi2  =   0.5190     
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Table 4.3.3.4 
Cook's Distance 
    code narcis~e CookSGA2 
5 Company 5 -0.536 . 
11 Company 6 -0.536 . 
12 Company 6 -0.536 0.1519372 
13 Company 6 0.26 0.1010533 
24 Company 1 -1.527 0.2381302 
28 Company 9 -2.518 0.1519372 
38 Company 10 -0.536 0.27777 
39 Company 10 -0.536 0.3123916 
58 Company 11 0.61 0.0710733 
72 Company 2 -1.277 0.0878033 
75 Company 3 -0.536 0.0708042 
 
Table 4.3.3.5 
Test for Omitted Variables 
   Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of 
sgasale_sqrt 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  
  
F(3, 62) =      9.43 
  
  
Prob > F =      0.0000       
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Table 4.3.3.6 
Linktest                 
Source SS df MS 
    
  
Model 
258.61915
2 2 129.31 
    
  
Residual 
59.741001
6 77 
0.7758
6 
  
Number of 
obs = 80 
Total 
318.36015
3 79 
4.0298
8 
  
F(  2,    77) = 166.67 
  
     
Prob > F = 0 
  
     
R-squared = 0.8123 
sgasale_sqr
t Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
 
Adj R-
squared = 0.8075 
_hat 0.7226846 
0.3127
1 2.31 
0.02
4 
 
Root MSE = 
0.8808
3 
_hatsq 0.0223265 
0.0247
9 0.9 
0.37
1 
   
  
_cons 0.7852689 0.9331 0.84 
0.40
3         
 
Table 4.3.3.7 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for the Normality of Residuals  
 Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
resSGA 80 0.98064 1.329 0.623 0.2668 
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Table 4.3.4.2 
Test of Mulitcollinearity - Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
rec~20092014 8.72 0.11464 
industrials 7.62 0.13122 
exp~20052007 7.24 0.13805 
consumergo~s 6.85 0.14598 
basicmater~s 6.43 0.15559 
consumerse~s 6 0.16656 
telecommun~s 5.65 0.17695 
recessi~2008 3.99 0.25064 
coo 3.09 0.3241 
ceoTenure_ln 2.21 0.45323 
narcissism~e 1.83 0.54759 
firmAge_ln 1.77 0.5653 
ceoage 1.42 0.70328 
currentrat~n 1.37 0.72941 
  
 
  
Mean VIF 4.59   
 
Table 4.3.4.3 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Ho: Constant variance 
 Variables: fitted values of FAAtTA 
     
 chi2(1)      =     2.13 
 Prob > chi2  =   0.1448 
  
Table 4.3.4.4 
Cook's Distance 
    code narcis~e CookFAA 
10 Company 5 3.957 0.1137726 
22 Company 12 -0.536 0.0586455 
74 Company 3 -0.536 0.0551749 
75 Company 3 -0.536 0.1051585 
85 Company 4 -2.21 0.1758898 
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Table 4.3.4.5 
Test for Omitted Variables 
   Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of FAAtTA 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
  
  
F(3, 67) =      1.35 
  
  
Prob > F =      0.2671       
 
Table 4.3.4.6 
Linktest 
        Source SS df MS           
Model 
53.534011
7 2 26.767 
  
Number of 
obs = 85 
Residual 
68.413631
6 82 
0.8343
1 
  
F(  2,    82) = 32.08 
Total 
121.94764
3 84 
1.4517
6 
  
Prob > F = 0 
  
     
R-squared = 0.439 
FAAtT
A Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
 
Adj R-squared = 0.4253 
_hat -3.119122 2.75801 -1.13 
0.26
1 
 
Root MSE = 
0.9134
1 
_hatsq -0.2036687 0.13622 -1.5 
0.13
9 
   
  
_cons -20.70169 13.9053 -1.49 0.14         
 
Table 4.3.4.7 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for the Normality of Residuals  
 Variable Obs W V z Prob>z 
resFAA 85 0.97405 1.872 1.379 0.0839 
 
 
 
 
